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Since at least 2002, Beijing has emphasized a policy of “going global” for state-owned 
enterprises, as well as, privately-owned domestic enterprises, that has led to over 
$68 billion of outward foreign direct investment from China. Outward foreign direct 
investment has been speculated as one possible medium for Beijing to exert soft power or 
engage in economic diplomacy, yet there is scant analysis on how OFDI has affected the 
Asia-Pacific regional geopolitical environment. This thesis attempts to bridge this gap in 
understanding by analyzing the economic effect of Chinese OFDI actions and presenting 
the historic and current scope of Chinese OFDI, interpreting Chinese OFDI through the 
lens of economic theory and realist theory, and tracking the changes in the geopolitical 
environment in the Asia-Pacific region since 2002 on a country-by-country basis. 
Overall, Chinese OFDI appears to be mostly in line with economic theory and has 
provided modest benefits to the Chinese economy, but there have been inconsistent and 
unpredictable shifts in the geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific region during 
China’s “Go Global” campaign.  
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B. IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................1 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESE..................................................................2 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................3 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES .........................................................................8 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW .....................................................................................9 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND OF CHINESE OFDI ...........11 
A. OFDI: PRIOR TO THE 14TH PARTY CONGRESS ...............................12 
B. CHINESE OFDI INTO THE 1990S .............................................................16 
C. CHINESE OFDI AND THE 1997–8 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS .........22 
D. “GO GLOBAL” AND BEYOND .................................................................24 
1. Government Policy: Promoting OFDI .............................................24 
2. The Geographic and Sectoral Distribution of Chinese OFDI ........25 
3. Current Determinants of Chinese OFDI .........................................32 
4. The Effect of Chinese OFDI on the Chinese Economy ...................35 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ..........................................................................36 
III. THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF CHINESE OFDI ...........................39 
A. THE ECONOMIC LENSES .........................................................................39 
1. Buckley and Casson’s Internalization Theory ................................39 
2. Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm............................................................41 
3. Analysis ...............................................................................................43 
B. THE REALIST LENS ...................................................................................46 
1. Realist Economic Theory ..................................................................46 
2. Analysis ...............................................................................................48 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ..........................................................................51 
IV. THE GEOPOLITICAL EFFECT OF CHINESE OFDI ON THE ASIA-
PACIFIC REGION ....................................................................................................53 
A. NORTH KOREA ...........................................................................................54 
B. SOUTH KOREA ............................................................................................56 
C. SOUTH PACIFIC ..........................................................................................58 
D. THE PHILLIPINES ......................................................................................61 
E. INDONESIA ...................................................................................................63 
F. JAPAN ............................................................................................................65 
G. TAIWAN .........................................................................................................66 
H. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ..........................................................................68 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................69 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................73 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................81 
 viii 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Flow of Chinese OFDI, 1979–1991 (From: Cai, “Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment,” 860). ............................................................................................13 
Figure 2. Share of Chinese OFDI, 1979–1993 (From: UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 1995, 57). .............................................................................................14 
Figure 3. Share of Chinese OFDI by Economy, 1990–2004 (From: Buckley et al., 
“Historic and Emergent Trends in Chinese Outward,” 726–7). ......................19 
Figure 4. Flow of Chinese OFDI, 1990–2000 (From: Wong and Chan, “China’s 
Outward Direct Investment,” 273). ..................................................................23 
Figure 5. Share of Chinese OFDI by Region, 2004–2010 (From: PRC MOFCOM, 
2010 Statistical Bulletin, 83–88)......................................................................27 
Figure 6. Value of Chinese OFDI by Region Excluding Hong Kong, 2004–2010 
(From: PRC MOFCOM, 2010 Statistical Bulletin, 83–88). ............................27 
Figure 7. Share of Chinese OFDI by Number of Fims in Geographic Regions 
(From: China Council for Promotion of International Trade et al., China 
Goes Global, 4). ...............................................................................................28 
Figure 8. Region and Global Share of OFDI by Sector (From: Derek Scissors, 
“China Global Investment Tracker,” last modified 19 July 2012). .................29 
Figure 9. Sectoral Share of Chinese OFDI by Number of Firms (From: China 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
BRIC  Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
CCP  Chinese Communist Party 
CIC  China Investment Corporation 
CITIC  China International Trust and Investment Corporation  
CMCC  China Metallurgical Construction Company 
CNOOC Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation 
CNPC  China National Petroleum Corporation 
DPRK  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) 
ECFA  Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
JVE  Joint Venture Enterprises 
MCC  China Metallurgical Group Corporation 
MNC  Multinational Corporations 
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce 
MOFERT Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
MOFTEC Ministry of Trade and Economic Cooperation 
NDRC  National Development and Reform Commission 
NOC  National Oil Companies 
OFDI  Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
OPEC  Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
 xii 
PIF  Pacific Island Forum 
PNOC  Philippine National Oil Company 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
ROC  Republic of China (Taiwan) 
ROK  Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
SAFE  State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
SCS  South China Sea 
SETC  State Economic and Trade Commission 
SOE  State-Owned Enterprise 
UN  United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
WIR  World Investment Report 




I would like to thank my two thesis advisors, Dr. Alice Miller and Dr. Robert 
Looney, for their support and assistance in writing this thesis and sharing the knowledge, 
insights, and opinions on Chinese policy and economics, respectively. I would like to 
further thank Dr. Christopher Twomey, Dr. Michael Glosny, Dr. Naazneen Barma, and 
Dr. Wade Huntley for their instruction, comments on chapters that were previously 
submitted as term papers, and instruction on the finer points of Chinese policy and 
political economy.  
 xiv 




A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis researches the effect of Chinese outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) on the Chinese economy and on the geopolitical environment. Divided into five 
parts, the following questions are addressed. First, why do firms, or states as may be in 
the case of China, invest abroad?  Second, how should the historic and current scope of 
China’s OFDI be assessed? Third, how has Chinese OFDI affected the Chinese 
economy?  Fourth, how do leading economic theories on OFDI and the realism theory of 
international relations account for the rise and increasing importance of Chinese OFDI?  
And last, what has been the geopolitical effect of Chinese OFDI on stability, security, 
cooperation, and economic interdependence in Asia, and specifically in the Asia-Pacific 
region? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Chinese outward foreign direct investment has grown from practically nothing 
prior to Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in 1978 to over $68 billion annually in 
2010.1 Additionally, since at least 2002, Beijing has emphasized a policy of “going 
global” for state-owned enterprises, as well as for privately-owned domestic enterprises. 
The increase in China’s OFDI, combined with growing tensions over its territorial 
claims, military modernization, and apprehension over economic turmoil from the global 
recession, has sparked fears that China will begin to challenge the current social, 
economic, and political order. Chinese investments in the Sudan, Myanmar, Pakistan, 
North Korea, and other states have been perceived by the West as having ulterior motives 
not limited to establishing a geo-strategic network to further expansionary goals and 
secure access to hydrocarbon energy resources.2 Further, significant, high-profile 
                                                 
1 Ministry of Commerce, 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 
(Beijing, China: People’s Republic of China, 2011), 79. 
2 Juli A. MacDonald, Amy Donahue, and Bethany Danyluk, Energy Futures in Asia: A Final Report 
(Mclean, Virginia: Booz-Allen Hamilton, 2004). 
 2 
acquisitions and mergers in the natural resources sector, such as the unsuccessful bid by 
the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) for the now defunct U.S.-
based petroleum exporter Unocal in 2005, and the ongoing, but seemingly successful, 
acquisition of Canadian-based oil and gas producer Nexen by CNOOC, have sparked 
fears that China’s outward expansion by state owned enterprises is part of a larger grand 
strategy by Beijing. Indeed, the perception in the West of these actions has led to 
turbulent and possibly deteriorating relations between the China and the United States as 
seen in statements during U.S. Congressional hearings that China is pursuing a 
mercantilist strategy against the United States.3 
Yet, as China’s economy and especially the massive amount of foreign reserves 
held by the Chinese government continue to grow, the possibility of further antagonistic 
and adversarial relationships increases because of China’s increasing OFDI and could 
threaten to destabilize the region. Thus, a faulty or incomplete understanding of the 
effects and implications of Chinese OFDI could unnecessarily threaten the stability of the 
region. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESE 
While the possibility that Chinese investment abroad could plausibly be part of a 
larger global strategy, the reaction by the West should not default to this conclusion and, 
in fact, could be wrong. A great deal of analysis and research has been slanted toward the 
premise that Chinese OFDI is a potential national security threat while failing to 
investigate alternative possibilities. 
I believe, and this thesis hypothesizes, that the scope of Chinese OFDI will be 
equally motivated by both economic and strategic, or national security, imperatives. Tied 
closely together since economic prosperity has been seen a path for the CCP’s political 
legitimacy, investment abroad in both economic and national security fields like 
petroleum-based natural resources will drive both possible interpretations of Chinese 
                                                 
3 Steven Lohr, Andrew Ross Sorkin, and Jad Mouawad, “Unocal Bid Denounced at Hearing,” New 
York Times, July 14, 2005. 
 3 
OFDI. Further, I hypothesize that there will be a moderate growth in the share of Chinese 
OFDI in the various global geographic regions like South America, Africa, and Europe. 
Additionally, this thesis hypothesizes that assessing Chinese OFDI through 
economic theory and realist lens shows that both lenses do not entirely account for 
investment actions, but each lens will conforms to certain aspects of China’s OFDI 
patterns.  
Finally, this thesis hypothesizes that Chinese OFDI’s geopolitical effect may 
serve to stabilize and pacify tensions. The outward investment will compel China to 
promote stability, and suppress hostile or destabilizing actions in regions where Chinese 
OFDI has been invested because that would just undermine its ability to generate a return 
on its investment. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the main subject and argument of this thesis is to determine the effect of 
Chinese OFDI on the geopolitical environment, there is a broad range of literature 
touching different aspects under review. This review first assesses the literature on 
multinational enterprises in the global economy and OFDI theory. Second, the review 
assesses the contemporary study of the Chinese economy and the depth of available 
knowledge specifically on Chinese multinational corporations, OFDI, and the economic 
effects of OFDI. There follows a survey of international relations theory and how that 
relates to political economy and other economic activities such as investing abroad. 
Finally, the review summarizes what analysis is available on the geopolitical security 
implications of China’s rising economic power, and the predictions China’s OFDI has on 
the Asia-Pacific region and the global environment.  
John H. Dunning’s Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy is, 
perhaps, one of the seminal publications on OFDI theory and framework. While nearly 
twenty years have passed since Dunning published the textbook, the analysis provided is 
still very much current. In it, Dunning conceptualizes his eclectic paradigm as a “general 
framework for determining the extent and pattern of both foreign-owned productions 
 4 
undertaken by a country’s own enterprises.”4 This paradigm which features a theoretical 
framework based upon three pillars of foreign market-seeking direct investment, 
efficiency, or cost reduction,-seeking direct investment, and resource-seeking direct 
investment is still used in contemporary analysis of determinants of OFDI.5 One 
commonly mentioned criticism of Dunning’s theory is that it was built upon analysis of 
OFDI stemming from developed nations and it may not hold as true for OFDI coming 
from developing nations. Regardless, it is still a very informative and though basis for the 
theoretical underpinnings of OFDI. 
Peter Buckley and Mark Casson provide the second major theory of OFDI with 
the internalization theory where firms “internalize missing or imperfect external markets” 
focusing on lowering costs.6 This second theory is still relevant today and is an excellent 
microeconomic theoretical basis for analyzing China’s OFDI. 
Using Dunning’s eclectic paradigm and the internalization theory, Buckley et al. 
developed one of the first empirical tests of the two theories against the recent historical 
record.7 Using data provided by the United Nations, the Chinese government, 
International Monetary Fund, and World Bank, Buckley et al. analyzed Chinese OFDI 
through 13 different hypotheses. This is an important and useful analysis of Chinese 
OFDI because previous assessments by Kevin Cai, John Wong, and Sarah Chan, to name 
a few, relied on comparative and interpretive analysis.8 
Previously mentioned earlier as primarily relying on comparative, interpretive, 
and historical analysis, Cai, Wong, and Chan still provide important additions to the 
                                                 
4 John H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy (Wokingham, England: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1993), 76. 
5 See Peter J. Buckley et al., “The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 
Journal of International Business Studies 38, no. 4 (July 2007): 499–518. 
6 See Peter J. Buckley and Mark Casson, The Future of the Multinational Enterprise (New York: 
Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1976). 
7 Peter J. Buckley et al., “The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment.” 
8 See Kevin G. Cai, “Outward Foreign Direct Investment: A Novel Dimension of China’s Integration 
into the Regional and Global Economy,” The China Quarterly 160 (December 1999): 856–80; John Wong 
and Sarah Chan, “China’s Outward Direct Investment: Expanding Worldwide,” China: An International 
Journal 1, no. 2 (September 2003): 273–301. 
 5 
literature regarding Chinese OFDI. Further, one of the most recent analyses of Chinese 
OFDI is by Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann who present a very balanced and 
thorough synthesis of new and emerging trends in the policy and direction of Chinese 
OFDI in the wake of the global financial crisis.9 For historical perspective, Michael 
McDermott and Chun Hua Huang present an early, descriptive account of Chinese OFDI 
from 1985 to 1992 when outward investment was truly in its infancy.10 These works are 
particularly important because some of the most authoritative accounts of the Chinese 
economy, in general, like Barry Naughton’s textbook, The Chinese Economy, provided 
scant attention to the growing importance of OFDI.11 
There is a growing wealth of literature on Chinese OFDI that analyzes the 
phenomenon through a firm specific lens. Yongjin Zhang provides deep investigations 
into China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), Sinochem, and 
Shougang, while Alan Rugman assesses the prospects and makes predictions on the 
future performance of Chinese transnational corporations through an analysis of the 
largest Chinese MNCs listed in Fortune Global 500.12 Rugman’s synthesis of UNCTAD 
2004 data is particularly insightful in demonstrating that OFDI stocks from Chinese 
MNCs comprise only a small portion of overall GDP, and his conclusion that MNCs 
“from emerging markets are not operating globally,” has significant impacts for the 
prospects of stability if one believes that OFDI is a driver of liberal interconnectedness 
and stability. 
                                                 
9 See Daniel H. Rosen, and Thilo Hanemann, “China’s Changing Outbound Foreign Direct Investment 
Profile: Drivers and Policy Implication,” PIIE Policy Brief PB 09–14 (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, 2012). 
10 See Michael McDermott and Chung Hua Huang, “Industrial State–owned Multi–nationals from 
China: The Embryonic Years, 1985–1992,” Asia Pacific Business Review 3, no. 1 (1996): 3–15. 
11 See Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 2007), 402–424, section covering foreign investment hardly covers or reviews outward 
investment, focusing solely on inward investment. 
12 See Yongjin Zhang, China’s Emerging Global Businesses: Political Economy and Institutional 
Investigations (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2003); Alan Rugman, “How Global are TNCs from 
Emerging Markets?” in Karl P Sauvant, ed., The Rise of Transnational Corporations from Emerging 
Markets: Threat or Opportunity (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008), 96–7. 
 6 
Making use of an institutional lens for the review of Chinese OFDI is Hinrich 
Voss, Peter J. Buckley, and Adam R. Cross’s analysis of how governmental policies and 
decisions have affected OFDI over the past 34 years since the implementation of Deng 
Xiaoping’s “open” policies.13 
Addressing scholarly critiques that current theories of OFDI and MNC are biased 
toward MNC and OFDI from developed nations, a few authors have taken to analyzing 
the current theories from emerging markets. Specifically, works by Karl Sauvant and an 
entire volume of works edited by Subhash C. Jain, uses the so-called BRIC nations of 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China to present conclusions as to the nature, performance, and 
future potential of multi-national corporations and outward investment from these 
states.14 
Moving toward the review of the literature pertaining to the effect of economics 
in terms of international relations, there has been a wide swath of theoretical analysis by 
numerous authors. Robert Gilpin’s The Political Economy of International Relations is a 
standard pallbearer in terms of side-by-side analysis of the tenants of realist (or as he 
calls it, nationalist) political economy, liberal institutionalism political economy, and 
Marxist political economy.15 Supplementing the realist perspective on political economy, 
Jonathan Kirshner’s chapter in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno’s volume on 
realism and state-strategies in the post-Cold War era attempts to meld traditional beliefs 
                                                 
13 See Hinrich Voss, Peter J. Buckley, and Adam R. Cross, “An Assessment of the Effects of 
Institutional Change on Chinese Outward Direct Investment Activity,” in Ilan Alon, Julian Chang, Marc 
Fetscherin, Christoph Lattemann, and John R. McIntyre, eds. China Rules: Globalization and Political 
Transformation (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2009, PDF e–book), 135–9. 
14 See Karl P. Sauvant, ed., The Rise of Transnational Corporations from Emerging Markets: Treat or 
Opportunity (Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2008); Karl P. Sauvant, “New 
Sources of FDI: The BRICs, Outward FDI from Brazil, Russia, India and China,” Journal of World 
Investment & Trade 6, no. 5 (October 2005): 639–709; Subhash C. Jain, ed. Emerging Economies and the 
Transformation of International Business: Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICs) (Northampton, 
Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2006). 
15 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1987). 
 7 
on free trade to support realist positions.16 Further rounding out the realist theory library 
is John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics, and Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace.17 Finally, Friedrich List presents, perhaps, one of the earliest 
economic nationalist perspectives in The National System of Political Economy.18 
Segueing toward the conclusion of this literature review is the combination the 
topics of economy and geopolitical security. Literature surveying this combination of 
topics usually focuses on regional level assessments of China’s economic growth and its 
effect on the region. For Asia, China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia takes 
together a diverse set of essays produced from different conferences and using a wide 
range of datasets, not limited to just the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and Chinese ministries; the two editors, William W. Keller and Thomas Rawski 
optimistically blend China’s rising economic power with the shifting geo-political 
environment. As with other surveys of Chinese capital investment inflows and outflows, 
China’s Rise gives less attention to outward investment flows from China, however, it 
does discuss the effect of changing levels of FDI in the Asia Pacific region.19 Similarly, 
China’s Economic Growth and the ASEAN provides a more focused assessment of 
changing trade, investment, and economic policy by China in primarily the Philippines 
but does survey the rest of Southeast Asia.20 
Along with growing analysis of the effect of China’s economic growth in Asia, 
new literature and reports are being made about the effect of China’s economic growth in 
                                                 
16 Jonathan Kirshner, “The Political Economy of Realism,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael 
Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 69–88. 
17 John Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 2002); 
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1979); Hans J. 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nation: The Struggle for Power and Peace 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1972). 
18 Frederich List, The National System of Political Economy, trans. Sampson S. Lloyd (Kitchener, 
Ontario, Canada: Batoche Books, 2001, E-book). 
19 William W. Keller, and Thomas Rawski, eds., China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia 
(Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007). 
20 Ellen H. Palanca, ed., China’s Economic Growth at the ASEAN (Manila, Philippines: Raintree 
Publishing, Inc., 2001). 
 8 
Africa and Latin America. For Africa, the Sino-Sudan relationship and investment has 
received numerous amounts of scrutiny, and most other Sino-African analysis have 
focused China’s relationship with regimes having dubious human rights records, resource 
extraction, and consequences for the region.21 For the Latin American region, using a 
wide range of data sets, Barbara Kotschwar, Theodore H. Moran, and Julia Muir provide 
a comprehensive and extremely current analysis of Chinese investment in the Latin 
American natural resource sectors.22 Further reviewing Chinese involvement in Latin 
America is the volume edited by Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, China’s Expansion 
into the Western Hemisphere: Implication for Latin America and the United States.23 
Roett and Paz assess the effects of China investments in Latin America, paying particular 
attention to lessons from Chinese investment in Southeast Asia and Africa, and the 
impact and possible complications of the United State-Latin America relationship. These 
and other regional perspectives are insightful because they provided a contextual basis for 
reviewing China’s rise especially regarding outward direct investment and so-called 
economic statecraft, commercial diplomacy, and the political economy of Chinese 
international relations. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
As the goal of this thesis is analyze the effect of Chinese outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) on the Chinese economy and on the geopolitical environment, the 
methodology to do so corresponds basically to a comparative study of the statistical 
analyses of Chinese OFDI in the Asian region, utilizing not only historical studies and 
                                                 
21 See Denis M. Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 44, no. 3 (September 2006): 459–79; Luke Anthony Patey, “Oil 
Companies and Armed Conflict in Sudan,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 5 (2007): 997–1016; Stephanie 
Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with 
Pariahs?” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (January-February 2008): 38–56; George T. Yu, “China’s African 
Policy: South–South Unity and Cooperation,” in Lowell Dittmer, and George T. Yu, eds., China, the 
Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2010), 
129–56. 
22 See Barbara Kotschwar, Theodore H. Moran, and Julia Muir, “Chinese Investment in Latin 
American Resources: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,” PIIE Working Paper Series WP 12–3 
(Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012). 
23 Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Implication for 
Latin America and the United States (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2008, PDF e–book). 
 9 
case studies but other comparative studies of the Chinese economy, OFDI, diplomacy, 
international relations, and regional security. 
Further, a number of statistical data sets regarding Chinese OFDI not mentioned 
in the literature review are used in this thesis. The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) presents annually its World Investment Report (WIR). The 
latest report was published for the 2012 annum presents a comprehensive regional, 
nation-specific, type, and sectorial views of global movements of foreign direct 
investment along with other direct investment statistics.24 Secondly, the People’s 
Republic of China’s (PRC) Ministry of Commerce’s (MOFCOM) “2010 Statistical 
Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment” which lists flows and stock of 
OFDI from China by region and country, as well as, providing limited contextual 
comparisons to other major economies engaged in OFDI.25 Finally, Derek Scissors and 
the Heritage Foundation provide a running tracker of large Chinese investments overseas 
by investor, sector, subsector, value, or price, and targeted company.26 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter presents the major 
research questions, the importance of the research questions, problems with the current 
conventional understanding and widespread implications of Chinese OFDI, proposes a 
tentative hypothesis that Chinese OFDI serves to stabilize and pacify the Asia-Pacific 
region, presents a review of the current pertinent literature on the topic, and details the 
methods and sources of found in the thesis. 
The second chapter presents the historical background and context of Chinese 
OFDI and, in doing so, answer the first three major research questions. By reviewing and 
analyze the historical pattern of Chinese OFDI and incorporating the latest statistical 
                                                 
24 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2012 (New 
York: United Nations, 2012). 
25 PRC MOFCOM, 2010 Statistical Bulletin. 
26 See Derek Scissors, “China Global Investment Tracker: 2012” Heritage Foundation, last modified 
July 9, 2012, accessed August 15, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/china-global-
investment-tracker-2012. 
 10 
bulletin on Chinese OFDI from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, this chapter presents 
how Chinese OFDI has expanded since the beginning the mid-1970s, analyzes the 
determinants and drivers, demonstrates what and how governmental policies promoted, 
directed, and suppressed OFDI, and assess the effect on the Chinese economy 
domestically. 
The third chapter analyzes the patterns of Chinese OFDI through the perspective 
of the realist theory of international relations in addition to analyzing OFDI through a 
lens of sound business practices to evaluate if Chinese OFDI could be a motivated 
squarely through normal corporate motivations. The fourth chapter assesses the 
geopolitical effects of Chinese OFDI in the Asia-Pacific region, specifically with Japan, 
on the Korean Peninsula, and in the South China Sea area. A final, fifth chapter briefly 
presents the conclusion of the thesis.  
 11 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND OF CHINESE 
OFDI 
Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has grown from practically 
nothing prior to Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in 1978 to over $68 billion annually 
in 2010, yet it is only very recently beginning to be studied.27 Indeed, one of the foremost 
textbooks on the Chinese economy, Barry Naughton’s The Chinese Economy: 
Transitions and Growth, barely alludes to this growing facet in his analysis of Chinese 
economic development.28 This chapter presents the historical context and background of 
Chinese OFDI and answers the first three major research questions of this thesis: why 
have Chinese firms invested aboard, how should the historical and current scope of 
China’s OFDI be assessed, and what has been the effect of Chinese OFDI on the Chinese 
economy? Overall, this chapter finds that the scope of Chinese OFDI has expanded 
greatly, but not overwhelmingly or threateningly, and, although the pattern appears 
inconsistent with international norms, Chinese OFDI is driven increasingly more by 
economic factors than governmental direction to individual firms. On a macro-level, 
government policies and institutional changes have demonstrated a significant ability to 
promote or suppress overall OFDI levels, which contributes to the understanding of 
determinants of Chinese OFDI. Finally, the benefit of Chinese OFDI on the Chinese 
economy has been mixed, thus far.  
This chapter addresses the major research questions in chronological order bound 
roughly by three major policy initiatives. The first period is approximately from the time 
of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms to about a year prior to the 14th Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) congress in 1992. The second period extends from the 14th CCP 
congress to the announcement of the zouchuqu “Go Global” policy at the turn of the 
century, and the third period is from zouchuqu to present. A vignette on OFDI during the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 to 1998 is presented, as well. 
                                                 
27 PRC MOFCOM, 2010 Statistical Bulletin, 79. 
28 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 402–24. 
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A. OFDI: PRIOR TO THE 14TH PARTY CONGRESS 
This section details China’s outward foreign direct investment for the time period 
just prior to 1978 to about a year prior to the 14th CCP Congress in 1992. The year 1978 
saw the launch of the “reform and opening” economic policy initiatives led by Deng 
Xiaoping, and much of the academic focus on economic reform has signaled this date as 
a fundamental turning point in China’s economy. This is particularly true for domestic 
reforms, yet even prior to 1978, the Chinese leadership was becoming increasing 
interested in initiating investment overseas. With the shift of United Nation (UN) 
membership from the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan to the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) in Beijing in 1971, the central government in Beijing began to focus on 
outward investment. The leadership particularly focused on multinational corporations by 
pressing for the publication of a Chinese version of a 1973 UN study titled Multinational 
Corporations in World Development even before Mao died.29 Prior to 1978, however, 
there was hardly any real investment by Chinese firms overseas, in part due to the overall 
policies and institutions of the Chinese economy and political leadership.30 
Moving into the late 1970s, Beijing began to explicitly promote overseas 
investment in various policy documents.31 To be sure, many of the policy directives of 
the time were internally and domestically focused, but there were clear signs of a shift in 
the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leadership regarding OFDI. 
Yongjin Zhang, a professor at the University of Bristol, has produced evidence of a State 
Council document from August 13, 1979 where the formation and support of Chinese 
overseas investments was one of the top thirteen priorities of economic reform.32 
The firms and corporations initially allowed to invest abroad were only state-
owned enterprises (SOE) that were administrated under the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) and “provincial and municipal international 
                                                 
29 Zhang, China’s Emerging Global Businesses, 50–1. 
30 Voss et al., “Effects of Institutional Change on Chinese OFDI,” 145; Zhang, China’s Emerging 
Global Businesses, 21. 
31 Zhang, China’s Emerging Global Businesses, 48. 
32 Ibid., 54. 
 13 
economic and technological cooperation enterprises” that were operated under the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). Applications for overseas investment were 
submitted to the State Council, which was the only authorizing body for investment 
overseas.33 The State Council’s policy priority during this period was to maintain or 
increase foreign reserves while ensuring that any outward investment would not cause the 
loss of financial reserves. This priority was reflected in the limited number of projects 
that were ever actually approved, and the relatively low, $950,000 average value of each 
international investment.34 Figure 1 presents graphically the total value of outward 
investments by year approved by the State Council during this period. These initial 
policies and regulations provide the first evidence to support this chapter’s argument that 
Chinese governmental policy could either significantly promote or suppress investment 
and it is clearly seen in Figure 1 with the increases in OFDI following official policy 
changes. 
 
Figure 1.  Flow of Chinese OFDI, 1979–1991 (From: Cai, “Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment,” 860). 
                                                 
33 Peter J. Buckley, Adam R. Cross, Hui Tan, Liu Xin, and Hinrich Voss, “Historic and Emergent 
Trends in Chinese Outward Direct Investment,” Management International Review 48, no. 6 (2008): 723, 
for previous two sentences. 
34 Wong and Chan. “China’s Outward Direct Investment,” 280; Voss et al., “Effects of Institutional 
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The geographic distribution of outward direct investment during the late-1970s 
and 1980s was heavily focused on investments in Hong Kong and Macao.35 Part of the 
investment might have occurred as a result of “round tripping,” where financial capital 
was moved to these locations only to be re-invested in mainland China to capitalized on 
favorable tax and financial policies aimed at attracting inbound FDI. Figure 2 presents a 
graphical representation of the geographic distribution of OFDI during this period. 
 
Figure 2.  Share of Chinese OFDI, 1979–1993 (From: UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 1995, 57).  
A second characteristic of the early overseas investments, particularly in the late-
1970s and early-1980s, was that the investments appear to have been more politically 
motivated rather than commercially or economically motivated. Kevin Cai notes that 
political influence in the approval of investments was “particularly evident in China’s 
heavy investment in Hong Kong and, to a lesser extent, in some strategically and/or 
politically important Third World countries.”36 This characteristic of intense 
governmental direction regarding OFDI establishes a basis for the evolution of 
governmental direction to firms on the determination and motivation of investments. 
                                                 
35 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1995, 57; Cai, “Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 864. 
36 Cai, “Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 859. 
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The projects and investments that were encouraged by the central government 
were to gain access to natural resources that were not abundant in mainland China, to tap 
into new technology through investment overseas, to open up new export markets for 
Chinese businesses, and to acquire managerial competency through engagement with 
Western corporations and other more sophisticated businesses.37  
Success in fulfilling the policy directive of gaining technology is apparent with 
the example of Shougang’s acquisition of Mesta International (or Mesta Engineering), 
where the Shougang (Capital Iron and Steel) was able to gain “access to state-of-the-art 
metallurgical design technologies.”38 Peter Nolan believes that this early example of 
Chinese globalization gave Shougang a technological edge building up the firm’s ability 
to continuously cast steel to meet not only domestic demand, but also international 
demand.39 Capitalizing on the need to gain access to an expanding pool of natural 
resources were Chinese investments in the Portland aluminum smelter in Victoria, 
Australia and the Mount Channar iron ore mine in west Australia. These investments 
were particularly successful, notably, because the cost of iron ore from west Australia 
was one-fortieth the cost of iron ore produced in China and allowed for the acquisition of 
sophisticated smelting technology not available in China.40 These early investment 
actions demonstrate that OFDI by Chinese firms credibly supported economic growth by 
providing necessary natural resources that were scarce domestically and increased the 
technological ability of firms in extracting natural resources both international and 
domestically. 
In the mid-1980s, the central government issued further institutional regulations 
pertaining to overseas investment that provide the second set of evidence to support this 
paper’s argument that the government had a significant ability to promote OFDI. 
MOFERT issued three important documents during this period: “MOFERT Circular 
                                                 
37 Voss et al., “Effects of Institutional Change on Chinese OFDI,”146. 
38 McDermott and Huang, “Industrial State–owned Multi-nationals from China,” 11, the exact name of 
the acquired firm changes depending on certain publications (Wong and Chen call the firm Masta). 
39 Peter Nolan, China and the Global Economy (London: Palgrave, 2001), 73. 
40 Mark Yaolin Wang, “The Motivations behind China’s Government-Initiated Industrial Investments 
Overseas,” Pacific Affairs 75, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 200–1. 
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concerning the Approval Authorities and Principles for Opening Non-Trade Joint 
Venture Overseas as well as in Hong Kong and Macao” (19 May 1984), “Provisional 
Regulations Governing the Control and Approval Procedures for Opening Non-Trade 
Enterprises Overseas” (July 1985), and “MOFERT Circular on the Approval Procedures 
for International Economic and Technical Cooperation Corporation to Set Up Overseas 
Subsidiaries” (July 1985). One of the most important changes stemming from the new 
institutional regulations was that any enterprise, regardless of ownership, could begin 
investing abroad it if had the financial resources and technical ability to do so. A second 
important institutional change brought on by these new regulations was the delegation of 
approval authority of investments overseas. As mentioned before, previously the State 
Council was the sole approving authority. In 1985, MOFERT was granted the authority 
to approve investments up to $10 million in value. Further delegated by MOFERT was 
approval authority of projects valued below $1 million to the provincial and municipal 
governments.41 The effect of these institutional changes are apparent from the significant 
increase in OFDI after 1984, as indicated in Figure 1, when overseas investments 
increased almost tenfold in both monetary value and number of projects approved.42 
B. CHINESE OFDI INTO THE 1990S 
In the 1990s, the central government began to take more steps to promote and 
encourage the institutional environment for outward investment. In 1991, with State 
Council Document No. 13 of 1991, the State Council further delegated approval authority 
for overseas investment up to $30 million to MOFERT. Additionally, Beijing reduced 
export tariffs on capital used by Chinese firms abroad, pressed for, and awarded 
preferential loans to Chinese corporations to move physical capital, and crafted simpler 
administrative procedures.43 Similarly, in 1995, SAFE revised the regulations for 
approval of overseas investments for provincial and municipal technological and 
economic cooperation enterprises. Fourteen provincial and municipal level SAFE offices 
                                                 
41 Zhang, China’s Emerging Global Businesses, 56–9. 
42 Buckley et al., “Historic and Emergent Trends,” 723. 
43 Zhang, China’s Emerging Global Businesses, 58–9, 73. 
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could approve projects up to $3 million in value.44 A final institutional change that 
occurred in 1992 was the shift from the People’s Bank of China regulating foreign 
investments of Chinese banks to having the newly instituted China Banking Regulatory 
Commission approve outward investment by Chinese financial institutions, which 
continues to present.45 
Becoming more particularistic in some ways, the central government began 
utilizing firm specific loans that favored, sometimes unfairly, certain firms over others 
engaged in similar operations overseas.46 Equally, if the firm was engaged in industries 
or operations the central government deemed to be strategically important, the firm 
would likely receive even more favorable loans, and tax breaks which continues to 
present day, especially in the capital intensive natural resource sector.47 These 
particularistic polices, which created soft budgetary constraints and moral hazards 
through essentially free money, have been interpreted by some as reasons why the 
Ministry of Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) increased scrutiny and 
restrictions on overseas investments in the latter half of the 1990s (MOFERT was 
renamed MOFTEC in 1993).48 
Further pressing for the liberalization of outward investment in the 1990s were 
policy directives from the CCP’s foremost leaders. On the heels of Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 
southern tour, CCP General Secretary, and later President of China, Jiang Zemin gave a 
speech where he listed ten priorities for economic reform. Number two on that list was 
that China “should encourage enterprises to expand their investments abroad and their 
transnational operations.”49 These statements made outward investment explicitly part of 
                                                 
44 Hinrich Voss, Peter J. Buckley, and Adam R. Cross, “Thirty Years of Chinese Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment” (working paper, University of Leeds, England, 2011), 13. 
45 Voss et al., “Effects of Institutional Change on Chinese OFDI,” 141. 
46 Zhang, China’s Emerging Global Businesses, 58–61. 
47 Voss et al., “Effects of Institutional Change on Chinese OFDI,” 149. 
48 Wong and Chan, “China’s Outward Direct Investment,” 281. 
49 Jiang Zemin, “Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s Report at 14th Party Congress,” Beijing Review, updated 
March 29, 2011, accessed August 25, 2012, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011–
03/29/content_363504_5.htm. 
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China’s economic development plan and were echoed by various different institutions 
within China like the State Council’s Research Office.50 The unequivocal proclamations 
in support of overseas investment by the CCP’s senior leadership are most likely 
significant factors in changing the perceived anti-OFDI opinions held by lower-level 
governmental personnel who, in turn, improved the commercial environment and 
inclination of businessmen to apply for investment abroad.51 
Similarly, not only did the central government press for overseas investment, but 
so did provincial, municipal and other local officials. Numerous conferences and 
seminars between local and provincial government officials, senior management of the 
largest transnational firms in China, and prominent economists established dialogues of 
cooperation. Such close coordination is reflected in the broad number of Chinese 
provinces that had relatively equal outward investments.52 The previous four paragraphs 
have presented the third set of evidence to support the argument that the Chinese 
government has a significant ability to promote OFDI. Beijing’s ability to promote OFDI 
will be complemented in the vignette on the effect of the Asian Financial Crisis where it 
will be demonstrated that Beijing had an equally strong ability to suppress overseas 
investment independent of the international environment. 
Chinese overseas investment during this period was much less concentrated 
geographically. At the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of overseas Chinese 
investments were in the relatively few developed economies. At the end of the 1990s, the 
majority of China’s overseas investments were scattered across the developing 
economies. This transition is presented graphically in Figure 3. Buckley et al. provide 
three estimations of why this transition occurred. First, Chinese firms’ “home country 
embeddedness” led them to conduct business in locations that firms from developed 
countries would not otherwise invest. Second, soft budget constraints particular to 
Chinese SOEs and easy access to excess capital from state lending made investments in 
                                                 
50 Zhang, China’s Emerging Global Businesses, 69. 
51 Eunsuk Hong and Laixiang Sun, “Dynamics of Internationalization and Outward Investment: 
Chinese Corporations’ Strategies,” The China Quarterly 187 (September 2006): 620. 
52 Zhang, China’s Emerging Global Businesses, 68. 
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politically unstable and economically less developed regions not as undesirable as 
Western nations might have perceived them to be. And third, there were changes in 
bilateral trade status, tariff reduction policies, and political motivations between Beijing 
and certain developing economies.53 Currently, however, the share of Chinese OFDI by 
economy has shifted dramatically back to developed countries not because investment 
patterns have changed per se, but because certain OFDI recipients, specifically Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and South Korea, have been reclassified as “developed economies;” 
with this shift the preponderance of Chinese OFDI is now in developed economies.54 
 
Figure 3.  Share of Chinese OFDI by Economy, 1990–2004 (From: Buckley et al., 
“Historic and Emergent Trends in Chinese Outward,” 726–7). 
In addition to the shifting geographic distribution of Chinese OFDI in the 1990s, 
another equally important shift occurred. The vehicle for investment shifted from 
predominantly joint venture enterprises (JVE) with foreign firms to wholly-owned 
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subsidies (WOS) without another foreign firm supporting.55 Buckley et al. provided three 
reasons to explain this shift, but a close review of each explanation make them appear 
less insightful than they originally were. The first reason given is the increasing 
efficiency of management of enterprises going abroad. This would seem to conflict with 
the increasing concerns about capital flight from China, which have been estimated as 
significantly increasing throughout the 1990s.56 Further, the fact that only one-third of 
Chinese investments abroad generated a profit would suggest that the firms did not 
materially improve their management ability.57 The second reason given is the greater 
volume of funds available to invest abroad, especially after the initiation of China’s “Go 
Global” policy (which will be discussed below). Again, this would seem to conflict with 
evidence of tightening of approval and scrutiny by the central government in the mid-
1990s, which will be discussed in the vignette on the Asian financial crisis, and 
empirically because the transition from JVE to WOS had, largely, occurred before the 
first mention of “Go Global” in 1999. The third explanation given is “the growth in 
international market entry by acquisition,” yet no information is presented to show 
whether this is accurate or why this would apply to Chinese firms. Ultimately, it is 
Buckley’s own theory on internalization of imperfect markets that might best explain that 
Chinese firms shifted from predominantly JVE to WOS because it helped in total profit 
maximization.58 Whatever the reason, it is important to note that the shift in preferred 
vehicles for investment did occur. 
In 1990s, there was also a shift in the reasons for Chinese firms to invest abroad. 
Motivations shifted from being exclusively governmentally directed to much more in line 
with both governmental desires and market factors, such as supply and demand and profit 
maximization. The following four paragraphs highlight the shift in motivations from 
solely government direction to complementary commercial motivations and support this 
                                                 
55 Buckley et al., “Historic and Emergent Trends,” 734–5 
56 Zhang, China’s Emerging Global Businesses, 38–9. 
57 Wong and Chan, “China’s Outward Direct Investment,” 277. 
58 Buckley and Casson, The Future of the Multinational Enterprise, 32, 36–7; Buckley et al., “Historic 
and Emergent Trends,” 734–5. 
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chapter’s argument that Chinese motivations are becoming much more in line with 
commercial and economic factors rather the governmentally or politically motivated 
factors. 
The most often cited motivation is to expand or maintain access to markets.59 One 
facet of this motivation is to limit the effect of trade barriers set up by foreign 
governments on the import of Chinese-made goods. A textile manufacturer, for example, 
purposely set up a factory in Mauritius to explicitly circumvent European and U.S. tariffs 
on textile imports from China.60 
A second commonly cited motivation was to maintain access to natural resources 
like mining, and fisheries.61 For example, one significant natural resource acquisition 
during the early 1990s included Capital Iron & Steel’s $120 million investment in Peru’s 
Hierros Mining operations.62 Similarly, as China became a net importer of oil and gas in 
1993, the Chinese national oil companies began to greatly expand overseas with 
operations in nearly every major petroleum export market.63 
Thirdly, gaining access to technology and management techniques was still 
emphasized as a motivation for Chinese OFDI.64 This was regularly the case with 
investments in Hong Kong-based firms due to the unique conservatorship of the area by 
the British government. 
A seldom mentioned motivation for Chinese corporations to set up operations 
abroad in the 1990s is that, in some instances, Chinese products commanded a lower 
                                                 
59 Cai, “Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 867; Wong and Chan, “China’s Outward Direct 
Investment,” 284; Hong and Sun, “Dynamics of Internationalization,” 622–4. 
60 Choo-Sin Tseng and Simon K.M. Mak, “Strategy and Motivation for PRC Outward Direct 
Investment with Particular Reference to Enterprises from the Pearl River Delta,” in Stewart MacPherson, 
and Joseph Y.S. Cheng, eds., Economic and Social Development in South China (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar, 1996), 154. 
61 Cai, “Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 868; Wong and Chan, “China’s Outward Direct 
Investment,” 285; Hong and Sun, “Dynamics of Internationalization,” 620–1. 
62 Hong and Sun, “Dynamics of Internationalization,” 621. 
63 Cai, “Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 868–9. 
64 Ibid., 869–70; Wong and Chan, “China’s Outward Direct Investment,” 285; Hong and Sun, 
“Dynamics of Internationalization,” 622–3. 
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price in foreign markets, so if a Chinese firm produced a product in another nation, the 
price the product could be sold at was greater. This was seen, for example, in decisions 
by a Chinese thermos manufacturer and a Chinese battery producer to move their 
production operations abroad.65 
C. CHINESE OFDI AND THE 1997–8 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Consistently in the contemporary literature on Chinese OFDI during the 1990s are 
accounts of the impact of the Asian financial crisis. Hinrich Voss et al. write: “In reaction 
to [the Asian Financial Crisis], MOFCOM tightened the approval procedure and enforced 
better screening and monitoring of each outward investment project.”66 Wong and Chan, 
oft referenced, write: “Following the Asian financial crisis, measures to clamp down on 
smuggling and illicit capital flight were implemented.”67 
Yet, Wong and Chan’s source concerning Beijing’s perceptions and measures to 
clamp down on reckless investments that contributed to capital flight was published 
before the crisis occurred. Indeed, in another source used by Wong and Chan, Chinese 
fears of capital flight were documented in 1994 at a high level conference led by a vice 
minister in the Ministry of Finance to determine how to prevent capital flight.68 Further, 
the State Council in 1993 issued a circular addressing the subject of capital flight and the 
need for better management to prevent it.69 These concerns and institutional changes are 
reflected in the significant drop in outward Chinese OFDI seen in Figure 4 much prior to 
the Asian financial crisis. Similarly, as Yongjin Zhang notes, Chinese OFDI actually rose 
during the crisis and only began to fall once the crisis had abated.70 The empirical 
evidence thus leads to a conclusion that the Asian financial crisis only had a marginal, if 
                                                 
65 Rosalina P. Tan, “Direct Foreign Investment Flows to and From China,” in Palanca, China’s 
Economic Growth at the ASEAN, 212 
66 Voss et al., “Thirty Years of Chinese OFDI,” 13. 
67 Wong and Chan, “China’s Outward Direct Investment,” 281. 
68 David Wall, “Outflows of Capital from China,” OECD Development Center Technical Paper no. 
123 (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development March , 1997), 41. 
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any, effect on Chinese OFDI and that institutional changes by the central government 
popularly linked to the crisis actually occurred prior. Secondly, it demonstrates, through 
the mid-1990s institutional and regulatory changes, that the central government could 
suppress OFDI. 
 
Figure 4.  Flow of Chinese OFDI, 1990–2000 (From: Wong and Chan, “China’s 
Outward Direct Investment,” 273). 
The one temporary institutional measure implemented during the crisis, a ban on 
provincial and local SAFE offices from approving outward investment, was only limited 
to small investments under $3 million in value and could be conceived of as aimed at 
stopping investments aimed at circumventing foreign exchange control by siphoning 
money off into Hong Kong and Macao. Further, those same investments could be made, 
and circumstantial evidence points to the fact that many were approved by higher 
authority.71 
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D. “GO GLOBAL” AND BEYOND 
1. Government Policy: Promoting OFDI 
Towards the end of the 1990s, perhaps, the single most important institutional 
change in Chinese OFDI policy occurred as leading government officials called for 
“going global.” The policy was explicitly confirmed and codified in the five-year plan 
that commenced in 2001.72 
The “Go Global” initiative, in addition to World Trade Organization accession by 
China in 2001, was supported by a host of additional, seemingly ad hoc, policies to spur 
increased overseas investment. The primary and most significant changes will be listed 
here. The approval process was further decentralized completely to subnational 
government authorities, with the exception of investments in seven sensitive economies 
such as Taiwan, Japan, the United States, and Iraq, to name a few, that still required 
national-level approval. Requests to invest abroad were no longer required to produce 
documentation of viability of the investment. Rather, the Chinese government simply 
stressed the need for an understanding of market economics and that management needed 
to be capable of dealing with overseas investments. Firms were allowed to maintain 
capital in foreign currencies, raise international capital, and reinvest earnings gained in 
foreign currency abroad without repatriating their earnings first. Security deposits on 
investments aboard were no longer required. Local SAFE branches were given wide 
latitude in approval of foreign capital investments and the review and regulatory burden 
was eased.73 
Another important institutional change was the issuance of guidance regarding 
preferred, target countries for Chinese firms by the National Development and Reform 
Commission, first in 2004 and since updated.74 This document is important because of 
perceptions of governmental direction in natural resource acquisition and perceptions of 
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possible mercantilist policies. However, while it is a list of “target” countries (which 
comprise nearly a third of all UN-member nations), firms are not bound to the list and 
often make investment in countries not on the list. This institutional change and the lack 
of total compliance by Chinese firms with the guidance reflect also the further shift of 
Chinese motivations for OFDI away from governmental direction and towards 
commercial economic factors. 
Third, an institutional change that has only very recently emerged is the use of 
Chinese OFDI as an alternative vehicle for investment of China’s substantial financial 
reserves.75 This is seen with the establishment of the China Investment Corporation 
(CIC), which is Beijing’s sovereign wealth fund and controls nearly $500 billion in 
assets. However, it is important to note the limit and scope of the CIC as it relates to 
OFDI. All of the top five portfolio holdings of the CIC and its subsidiaries are based in 
China.76 As for overseas investment assets, Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann remark, 
“In reality, these state entities usually take minor stakes, and only in a very few cases do 
the stakes exceed the 10 percent threshold needed to qualify as FDI. In short, it is China’s 
firms that generate the country’s outbound FDI action.”77 
To conclude this chapter’s argument that governmental policy has the ability to 
significantly influence either the promotion or suppression of OFDI, the monumental 
spike in OFDI since the “Go Global” policy is but the fifth episode demonstrating the 
government ability promote or suppress the growth of OFDI. In 1978, 1984–5, 1992, 
1993–4, and again in with “Go Global” call, government policy demonstrated an uncanny 
ability to influence the growth of OFDI on a macro-level. 
2. The Geographic and Sectoral Distribution of Chinese OFDI 
The geographic distribution of OFDI in the 2000s has been one of the most 
controversial topics about the Chinese economy due to the perception that China is 
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casting its financial net across all corners of the globe. These perceptions are not entirely 
true, but complications from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), SAFE, and other 
Chinese ministries’ statistical reporting of OFDI do not help. For instance, only the initial 
destination of Chinese OFDI is reported, leaving the ultimate destination unclear.78 How 
large of a problem is this? Considering that over 55 percent of Chinese OFDI goes 
through Hong Kong and another 20 percent flows to other destinations considered to be 
tax havens and financial clearinghouses, like the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, 
and, recently, Luxembourg, the problems are considerable. A second complication of 
Chinese reporting comes from a unique categorization of regions. For instance, the 
“Asia” region in the MOFCOM 2010 “Statistical Bulletin on China’s Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment” stretches from Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea to eastern shores of 
Indonesia.79 (In 2003, MOFTEC was reorganized into MOFCOM and, additionally, a 
number of Chinese agencies were subsumed under it.) 
There are, however, keen insights that can be gleaned from a rough appraisal of 
the annual flows of OFDI geographically. Africa, largely considered to be a prime 
location for Chinese OFDI and a focal point for the belief that China is attempting to 
“buy up” the world’s natural resources, has, but for one year in 2008, maintained a 
consistent four to six percent share of Chinese OFDI flows by value since the onset of the 
“Go Global” policy. By contrast, the less often mentioned Latin American region has 
seen a much more sustained flow of OFDI, having an average annual investment share of 
about 26 percent of total Chinese OFDI throughout the 2000s. More recently, Europe has 
become a prime destination for Chinese OFDI, receiving the third largest amount of 
OFDI stock, behind Asia and Latin America.80 Figures 5 and 6 present graphically these 
statistics.  
                                                 





Figure 5.  Share of Chinese OFDI by Region, 2004–2010 (From: PRC MOFCOM, 2010 
Statistical Bulletin, 83–88). 
 
Figure 6.  Value of Chinese OFDI by Region Excluding Hong Kong, 2004–2010 (From: 
PRC MOFCOM, 2010 Statistical Bulletin, 83–88). 
The geographical distribution data, however, can be manipulated to give 
alternative results. If the number of firms invested in particular regions is used as the 
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survey of Chinese firms conducted jointly by three IGOs, including the U.N. Commission 
on Trade and Development, found, using this previously mentioned method, that Asia is 
still the dominate region of investment, but ranking a close second, third and fourth were 
North America, Europe, and Africa.81 Figure 7 presents graphically these statistics. These 
alternative statistical presentations can lead to the alternative perceptions of China OFDI 
activities.  
 
Figure 7.  Share of Chinese OFDI by Number of Fims in Geographic Regions (From: 
China Council for Promotion of International Trade et al., China Goes 
Global, 4). 
Official MOFCOM statistics on the sectoral distribution of Chinese OFDI suffer 
from similar deficiencies as those on geographic distribution. The MOFCOM sectoral 
numbers are not aligned to industry standards and do not reflect the final industry 
invested in.82 Using Derek Scissor’s global tracker of Chinese investments from 2005 to 
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present, a sketch of the sectoral distribution can be made and is presented in Figure 8. 
Energy production and metal mining, smelting, and processing are the two largest 
sectors. Unfortunately, investments under $100 million in value are not typically captured 
in Scissor’s tracker and this could significantly alter the number given that the average 
value of Chinese overseas investments, by stock, is approximately $20 million.83 
However, you measure it, the sectoral distribution of Chinese OFDI does not compare 
with the global trends, and, in the words of Rosen and Hanemann, “is not consistent with 
international norms.”84  
 
Figure 8.  Region and Global Share of OFDI by Sector (From: Derek Scissors, “China 
Global Investment Tracker,” last modified 19 July 2012). 
Again, as mentioned in the geographic distribution section, the statistics can be 
manipulated, so to speak. Using the survey of Chinese firms mentioned earlier that 
utilizes number of firms invested in sectors as opposed to total value, the manufacturing 
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sector becomes the leading category, followed by a close second, third and fourth ranking 
of mining, wholesale/retail, and agriculture.85 Figure 9 presents these results graphically.  
 
Figure 9.  Sectoral Share of Chinese OFDI by Number of Firms (From: China Council 
for Promotion of International Trade et al., China Goes Global, 6). 
The previously mentioned sectoral and geographic distribution may seem to be 
impressive and expansive, and there is no doubt that since 1978 that China’s OFDI has 
expanded greatly. In a global context, however, it is has only barely increased compared 
with other economies expanding at only a slightly faster pace. Chinese OFDI outflows 
from 2000 to 2007 accounted, on average, for less than one percent of the total global 
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OFDI outflows and China’s outflow was less than that of Russia who China is 
consistently grouped with under the BRIC rubric.86 
In terms of sheer volume of OFDI stock, China is far below other nations. China 
has only the 15th highest OFDI stock and just passed Russia by $3 million in 2011. 
Comparatively, the United States, which is characteristically number one on the list of 
OFDI stock, has more OFDI stock than all of the developing economies, including China, 
combined, and accounts for over a fifth of the entire global share of OFDI. China, in 
2011, by UNCTAD standards, accounted for less than two percent of the entire global 
share of OFDI stock.87 Rosen and Hanemann produced a striking statistic of per capita 
OFDI stock for selective economies: in 2009, China’s per capita OFDI stock was at 
approximately at $70 per person; India’s was $25; UAE’s was $6,100; the United States 
was $9,300; Germany came in with a whopping $15,000 of OFDI stock per capita!88 In 
this light, total Chinese OFDI stock is growing, but it is not nearly at the levels of other 
economies, developed and developing. 
The sectoral distribution, especially the emphasis on the natural resources, is also 
not so striking in the global context. Chinese firms do have an investment pattern that is 
not consistent internationally, but, even with China’s impressive investment into the 
energy sector, roughly 90 percent of the global oil reserves are owned by other national 
oil companies and are not for sale.89 Further, under Buckley and Casson’s theoretical 
internationalization framework, the partially internalization of certain markets, especially 
ones involving strategically and economically important natural resources like petroleum 
and energy reserves, is actually the most economically efficient method to reduce the 
high costs of total internalization of markets but capitalize on the benefits of 
internalization. In effect, China is creating the ability to maintain a more stable market, 
not only in China but worldwide, because it can balance the external market with a 
separate internal market and because it is becoming one of the primary global consumers 
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of natural resources.90 In that light, China’s OFDI, especially in natural resources, makes 
a lot of economic and commercial sense and Beijing’s approach appears less mercantilist. 
Finally, there are just some sectors, like commercial aircraft manufacturing, that are so 
dominated by a small number of established firms, in which it is going to be extremely 
difficult for a Chinese firm to capture any amount of market share in the near to medium 
term, let alone a significant amount of market share.91 
To wrap up this chapter’s argument that Chinese OFDI has expanded greatly but 
not overwhelmingly, when the geographic and sectoral distribution of Chinese OFDI is 
viewed through a contextual lens that takes into consideration the global environment, 
Chinese OFDI does not appear to be as dominant, dramatic, or as threatening as it can 
popularly be perceived. 
3. Current Determinants of Chinese OFDI 
The determinants to invest abroad by Chinese firms since the inception of the “Go 
Global” policy have remained relatively consistent with those in the prior decade. These 
determinants are: to expand or maintain access to markets; to gain or maintain access to 
natural resources; and to gain access to technology and management techniques. A new 
determinant that has arisen in the 2000s is the desire to gain what are termed “strategic 
assets,” which will be discussed below. Secondly, the general trend of less government 
dictation of corporate plans and policy in favor of following market forces has become 
even more apparent. Finally, with better quality data on Chinese OFDI from various 
sources, new models based on empirical mathematical regression are producing new 
results that differ from conventional understanding of Chinese OFDI motivations. This 
subsection will discuss three topics pertaining to OFDI determinants: acquisition of 
strategic assets; government policy that is even more hands off in terms of direction 
OFDI; and new mathematical models that are challenging conventional wisdom on 
Chinese motivations. 
                                                 
90 For the theoretical framework see Buckley and Casson, The Future of the Multinational Enterprise, 
38–42. 
91 Nolan, Is China Buying the World?, 119–126. 
 33 
Firstly, “strategic assets” are not assets that have geopolitical, military, or security 
related disposition. Rather, they are “strategic” in a commercial sense, such as brands and 
name recognition that carry clout and instant appeal. Contemporary examples are Apple, 
Google, BMW, Mercedes, Trek bicycles, etc. Previously, Chinese firms in general failed 
to craft instantly recognizable marketable and sustainable brands indigenously.92 
Recently, Chinese firms have begun to acquire some internationally recognizable brands. 
Examples are Lenovo acquisition of IBM’s laptop subsidiary, Haier’s purchase of 
Thomson TV and its failed bid for Maytag, Geely’s purchase of Volvo Cars, among 
others. Thus, far, however, China has been less than successful in translating purchases of 
brands into strategic assets that have international appeal. Alan Rugmen, in a scathing 
critique, notes that all of the Chinese firms in the Fortune 500 list of largest corporations 
have 95 percent of their sales in China, and the strategic assets purchased have been 
distressed, technologically inferior, and, basically, obsolescent brands.93 These keen 
insights support this paper’s argument that the Chinese OFDI expansion out pacing or 
making dramatic gains on the international community, and Chinese OFDI is driven by 
commercial motivations because strategic asset purchases, in and of themselves, are 
consistent with John Dunning’s conventional theory on internationalization.94 
The second shift in determinants of Chinese firms since the “Go Global” policy 
was announced is that has become quite clear that motivations of Chinese companies 
have become almost entirely detached for governmental policy. The government defers 
managerial decisions and investment choices to the business firms, and it only has a 
significant hand, if that, in very large high profile investments. Rosen and Hanemann 
quip, “The image of agents from the Politburo commanding state enterprises to ‘go buy 
the world’ is largely fictitious.”95 Similarly, the long running survey of Chinese corporate 
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executives lists overseas market potential as being more and more dominant in 
motivating firms to invest or go abroad.96 
Interestingly, perceptions are growing that some of China’s largest firms are 
beginning to actually influence the central government now. This is especially true in the 
conduct of some of China’s most “strategically” important state-owned firms: the 
national oil companies (NOCs). High profile petroleum operations in the Sudan pitted 
two of the four national oil companies against each other, leading Sinopec to partner with 
a Malaysian oil company to undercut a Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
bid by over $60 million. Sinopec not only followed market principles but bucked the 
“guidance” from the central government, leading the central government to modify its 
diplomatic positions with other governments.97 
The final discussion on Chinese OFDI determinants is in terms of new 
mathematical models that empirically test motivations for investment. Commonly tested 
hypotheses are the natural resource-seeking hypothesis and market-seeking hypothesis.98 
Consistently, empirical mathematical regression has found that natural resources are not a 
primary motivation for Chinese OFDI, and that the farther away from China an 
investment location is, the less likely Chinese firms will actually invest in that location.99 
The only motivational hypothesis that withstands the tyranny of statistics is the 
motivation to expand the number of markets Chinese products are available in. While 
these models produce interesting and provocative results, they must be regarded with 
some skepticism, however, because many of the data relied upon only use the initial 
location of OFDI, which is extremely slanted towards Hong Kong. 
                                                 
96 China Council for Promotion of International Trade et al., China Goes Global 2011, 8. 
97 Chih-shian Liou, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 670–90. 
98 K. C. Fung, Alicia Garcia-Herrero, and Alan Siu, “A Comparative Empirical Examination of 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment from Four Asian Economies: People’s Republic of China; Japan; 
Republic of Korea; and Taipei, China,” Asian Development Review 26, no. 2 (2009): 86–101; Buckley et 
al., “The Determinants of Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 499–518. 
99 Ibid. 
 35 
4. The Effect of Chinese OFDI on the Chinese Economy 
The effect of Chinese OFDI on the Chinese economy at home is inherently hard 
to quantify. The economy has benefited in some ways and in other ways it still has yet to 
realize any benefit, and there have been few negative effects. 
The institutional policies discussed above have had a substantial effect on the 
overall outward investment pattern of Chinese firms and on the Chinese economy. 
Undoubtedly, investments in the natural resource sectors have secured the requisite 
resource inputs required to maintain economic growth in China. 
Further, the investments have created a global infrastructure for the integration of 
China into the global economic system by modernizing the logistics system and building 
international connections and offices abroad.100 Chinese infrastructure investments in the 
developing world have been in wide array of different activities like roads, ports, 
stadiums, and hospitals, that have, more often than not, been complete on time and on 
budget, and have, in Peter Nolan’s words, “made important contributions to [Chinese] 
economic development.”101 
While these investments in infrastructure abroad have increased the ability of 
Chinese firms to operate in the international community, there has been some criticism 
that Chinese investments toward certain regions and countries have neglected or damaged 
the local populations through exploitive work practices, especially in Africa.102 These 
perceptions can have a negative effect on Chinese economy due to the fact that it leads 
some people to boycott Chinese products and cause diplomatic issues. 
The management skills and abilities of Chinese firms to manage global operations 
have not significantly benefited and are still a liability for the overall effectiveness of 
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China’s OFDI on the economy at large.103 The current inefficiency of Chinese 
management provides grounds for some optimism that Chinese OFDI still has untapped 
potential to benefit the Chinese economy because only the most efficient and adept firms 
are able to prosper internationally and that will eventually translate into the domestic 
economy.104 In this light, the Chinese economy is just now beginning to benefit from 
increases in management and corporate know-how from OFDI, and the next 15 to 20 
years will be the test to see whether Chinese firms can apply what they have learned thus 
far from their international experience to the domestic economy. 
The Chinese economy has not benefited from strategic assets acquisitions, thus 
far. Chinese firms have yet to establish recognizable international brands like the Koreans 
have with Hyundai and Samsung or the Japanese with Sony, Toyota, and Honda. This is 
not to say that Chinese will not do so; it is just that thus far, the “go global” policy has 
not produced a strategic asset that is unequivocally associated with China. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Chinese OFDI will continue to be a politically and economically important topic 
in the years to come. Based upon UNCTAD and contemporary reporting, the next 
statistical bulletin on OFDI from China released by the MOFCOM will almost 
undoubtedly show a greater flow of FDI from China. This chapter has presented the 
historical context and background of Chinese OFDI and answers the first three major 
research questions of this thesis: why have Chinese firms invested aboard, how the 
historical and current scope of China’s OFDI should be assessed, and what the effect of 
Chinese OFDI on the Chinese economy has. Overall, the scope of Chinese OFDI has 
expanded greatly, but not overwhelmingly or threateningly, and, although the pattern is 
inconsistent with international norms, Chinese OFDI is driven increasingly more by 
economic and commercial factors than governmental direction to individual firms. On a 
macro-level, government policies and institutional changes have demonstrated a 
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significant ability promote or suppress OFDI. Finally, the benefit of Chinese OFDI on the 
Chinese economy has been mixed, thus far. 
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III. THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF CHINESE OFDI 
In the literature on contemporary China, there are growing schisms between 
scholars who believe China is engaging in a vast grand strategy to achieve potentially 
nefarious goals or rival the current global, political, economic, or security framework and 
those who see a pragmatic China trying to incorporate itself in existing frameworks and 
find its place within the global order. Underlying these two arguments are theoretical 
beliefs that are imposed on interpretation of China’s actions. This chapter attempts to 
interpret Chinese OFDI systematically through the theoretical underpinnings that guide 
current discourses. Economic theory on foreign investment created by Peter Buckley, 
Mark Casson, and John Dunning is presented first, followed by an analysis of Chinese 
OFDI through these lenses. Following the economic lens, an analysis of Chinese OFDI 
through the realist lens, or realist international theory, is presented. Each lens has areas of 
convergence and divergence in interpreting Chinese OFDI, with the economic lens 
appearing better suited to interpret Chinese OFDI than the realist lens. 
A. THE ECONOMIC LENSES 
Chinese OFDI can be assessed through the leading economic theories regarding 
overseas investment. The two theories that will be used to assess Chinese OFDI though 
an economic lens are the internalization theory developed by Peter Buckley and Mark 
Casson, and John Dunning’s eclectic paradigm.105 The first subsection section briefly 
sketches these two theories, and the second subsection assesses how closely the facts of 
Chinese OFDI match the two theories. 
1. Buckley and Casson’s Internalization Theory 
Buckley and Casson’s internalization theory was developed to account for failures 
of the conventional theory of production where profit maximization and perfectly 
competitive markets are assumed. Internalization theory breaks with conventional theory 
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in assuming that markets are not always perfect (because if the market was perfect, it 
could not be improved upon) and that firms internalized these market imperfections by 
“bringing under common ownership and control the activities which are linked by the 
market.”106 The fact that this internalization occurs across national boundaries creates so-
called multinational enterprises and stimulates outward investment. 
The theory identifies five market imperfections that compel firms to internalize 
markets. First, complex, integrated operations linked to the market may require a 
significant lapse of time to complete, but insufficient futures market exists to coordinate. 
Second, profit maximization might require unfeasible discriminatory pricing in the 
external market. Third, excessive concentration of market power to one side creates an 
unstable bargaining position. Fourth, unequal knowledge exists between the buying and 
seller. And fifth, governments may implement ad valorem tariffs and other restrictions 
like non-trade barriers in the international marketplace. Buckley and Casson identify 
certain markets that have a higher concentration of these imperfections, and firms in 
those markets have stronger incentives to internalize: the market for knowledge (which 
includes research and development) since it is time consuming, without a futures market, 
a natural monopoly, and is difficult to price; and the market for perishable agriculture, 
capital intensive manufacturing process, and raw materials that are geographically 
concentrated.107 
While there are numerous benefits to internalization, firms will also have to bear 
certain costs in the process: possibly higher resource costs because a single external 
market is now divided up into smaller, more numerous internal markets within a firm 
(this can be offset by only partial internalization of external market); communication 
costs stemming from greater centralized control, especially over longer distances; market 
fragmentation, which can make overhead costs increase; and greater costs to ensure 
internal accuracy of information that external markets theoretically regulate 
automatically. A final cost of internalization is political interference against foreign firms 
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and governmental “patronage to indigenous producers” and the threat of nationalization 
of industries. Finally, internalization also requires proficient and credible ability to 
oversee diverse activities that possibly could be taking place all over the world.108 
The confluence of these costs, benefits, governmental factors, suitability of the 
industry leads to the “interplay” of four factors: industry-specific factors, regional-
specific factors, nation-specific factors, and firm-specific factors. Industry-specific 
factors are the “nature of product, structure of external market, and relation of optimal 
scales of activities.”109 Region-specific factors are the geographic separation in terms of 
not only distance but also psychic “social” perceptions. Nation-specific factors are the 
political environment of the nations involved. Finally, the firm-specific factor is the 
ability of the firm to be able to organize and execute multinational operations.110 
2. Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm 
John Dunning, professor emeritus at Rutgers University and Reading University 
in the United Kingdom, developed his eclectic paradigm of multinational enterprises and 
investment as “a general framework for determining the extent and patter of both foreign-
owned production undertaken by a county’s own enterprises and also that of domestic 
production owned by foreign enterprises.”111 In this sense, Dunning’s paradigm presents 
a structure that firms can use to capitalize on specific advantages in the multinational 
arena to be successful. Building on the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade theory and 
explicitly incorporating previous theories, Dunning identifies three specific advantages 
that contribute to a firm investing abroad: ownership-specific advantages, location-
specific advantages, and internalization-specific advantages. These three advantages are 
where the paradigm receives it oft used label of “OLI model.” 
Ownership-specific advantages are developed out of traditional industrial 
organization theory. They include property rights and intangible assets advantages like 
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product innovations, resources of the firm, and organization of work. Similarly, 
minimization of transaction costs through common ownership within organization 
complements the ownership-specific advantages listed above. Applied to common 
international production determinants, like natural resources seeking, market seeking, and 
strategic asset seeking, ownership-specific advantages contribute capital, technology, 
economies of scale, management efficiency, and synergy of effort.112 
Location-specific advantages, in Dunning’s words, “include not only Ricardian 
type endowments, but also the cultural, legal, political, and institutional environment.”113 
In essence, the physical and institutional host and home country environment can 
contribute to the reasons and the patterns of investment overseas. Such political and 
institutional factors include artificial barriers or conduits like ad valorem taxes, free trade 
policies, and non-trade barriers. Similarly, the physical environment influences location 
specific advantages through potential communication cost of transportation (especially 
seen with international canals, straits, and waterways like the Panama Canal and the 
Strait of Malacca), in addition to, the presence, distribution, and concentration of natural 
resources in a particular location. Location advantages, when applied to common 
international invest determinants like natural resources seeking, market seeking, and 
strategic asset seeking, include: acquiring possession of natural resource concentrated 
real estate, direct access to new markets, and utilization of transportation and 
communication facilities.114 
The final specific advantage Dunning identifies in his eclectic paradigm is 
internalization advantages. This advantage includes the market imperfections identified 
earlier by Buckley and Casson and other imperfections identified by international 
economists like Stephen Hymer to aid in maximizing profit and minimizing cost through 
the “circumvention or exploitation of market failure.”115 Most of the imperfections have 
already been mentioned in the earlier section on internalization theory, but Dunning 
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includes such “anti-competitive” practices as predatory pricing, cross-subsidization, and 
monopolization of market outlets as reasons of why firms choose to invest abroad. In 
terms of international production determinants, like natural resources seeking, market 
seeking, and strategic asset seeking, internalization advantages convey the ability to 
ensure stability of supplies, reduce transaction uncertainty, improve competitive 
advantage and mitigate risk.116 
3. Analysis 
Using these theoretical lenses, Chinese OFDI can be interpreted in line with 
standing economic theory. This subsection links Chinese OFDI actions with the tenets of 
the previous two theories to see how Chinese OFDI may align. 
The five market imperfections noted by Buckley and Casson in their 
internalization theory provide the first point of comparison. The first market imperfection 
noted, integrated operations linked to the market may require significant lapse of time to 
complete but insufficient futures market to coordinate, is only partially valid. Tied closely 
to natural resource extraction, many natural resources that are commonly targeted by 
Chinese investment like hydrocarbons and metals have robust and competitive futures 
markets located in major economic centers like New York, London, and, even, 
Shanghai.117 
The second market imperfection—profit maximization requiring unfeasible 
discriminatory pricing—can be seen as a rational action by Chinese firms, especially 
state-owned enterprises and corresponds to some actions by Chinese firms. This can be 
applied correctly to factors regarding the retail price of gasoline and products that have 
governmentally-set prices. Because the NDRC sets the retail price of certain commodities 
artificially low, internalization of certain natural resource markets can help NOCs 
maximize profit (or inhibit mounting losses) and falls in line with Buckley and Casson’s 
theory. Chinese NOCs internalize international production of energy resources, sell some 
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of the product on the international market at a higher price than the domestically set 
price, and help minimize losses accrued through the retailing of artificially low priced 
petroleum products in China. 
Third, the market imperfection listed in internalization theory—excessive 
concentration of market power to one side creating an unstable bargaining position—
holds very true in China’s case. Again, chiefly seen in the natural resource sector, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has been described as a cartel 
with an excessive concentration of market power that leads to a preferable bargaining 
position, and attempts by China to expand its control over petroleum resources through 
OFDI is in line with Buckley and Casson’s internalization theory.118 While there is 
debate as to how much OPEC exhibits cartel behavior, it is only necessary for the 
impression to exist to create an impetus for firms to act to limit any potential unfavorable 
bargaining position. Chinese OFDI appears to fall in line with the third reason Buckley 
and Casson give for why firms would invest abroad. 
The fourth market imperfection listed by Buckley and Casson—unequal 
knowledge between the buying and seller—has limited utility in explaining China’s 
OFDI surge. This imperfection in probably best served for reasons why there is an 
increase in FDI into China due to the perception about the reliability, consistency, 
quality, and efficacy of Chinese firms, especially in manufacturing and production. 
Finally, the fifth market imperfection that compels the internalization of a 
market—governmental implementation of ad valorem tariffs and other restrictions—is 
extremely relevant in terms of Chinese OFDI actions. In Chapter II, this thesis 
documented Chinese investment into certain African and SE Asian nations explicitly to 
circumvent European Union and U.S. import taxes placed on certain manufactured goods. 
Similarly, in September 2009, the United States imposed exacting 35 percent import 
tariffs on Chinese tires signaling that tariffs on Chinese products are still a common 
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occurrence and give further credence to Chinese OFDI actions to thwart crippling 
sanctions and other barriers.119 
Moving to the assessment of Chinese OFDI through Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, 
many similarities and connections, too, can be drawn. From the ownership-specific 
advantages perspective, China’s substantial OFDI into natural resources that were 
extensively documented in Chapter II thesis falls in line with the eclectic paradigm, as it 
provides access to markets, and negotiating strength. Further, the privileged access by 
firms to strategic resources gives them an advantage against their competitors. With 
regard to the manufacturing and strategic assets investments by Chinese firms, ownership 
advantages have been seen in the access to management and organizational skills and the 
bourgeoning focus on the ability to generate and gain brand loyalty. Overall, in terms of 
assessing Chinese OFDI specific actions with regard ownership-specific advantages, 
there are many parallels. 
The second part of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm—location-specific advantages—
is only partially evident in Chinese OFDI actions. In terms of market seeking 
international investment, material and labor costs are usually not a motivating factor 
which is listed one of the primary impetuses for location-specific investments.120 Within 
the natural resources sector, however, the parallels between location specific-advantages 
and Chinese OFDI are clear: limited domestic supply of certain resources compels 
international investment where the resources are abundant. Overall, Chinese OFDI only 
partially matches the location-specific advantages of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm. 
The final portion of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm—internalization-specific 
advantages—has been detailed extensively in the first part of this section’s analysis. 
To conclude, Chinese OFDI patterns seem fairly consistent with economic theory 
regarding international investment. Chinese OFDI is consistent with three of the five 
reasons Buckley and Casson put forward as to why a firm would want to internalize 
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international production. Similarly, Chinese OFDI is mostly consistent with Dunning’s 
eclectic paradigm of ownership-specific, location-specific, and internalization-specific 
advantages for international investment. 
B. THE REALIST LENS 
Consistently in contemporary literature, Chinese economic activity has been 
interpreted as facet of a realist grand strategy.121 This section analyzes Chinese OFDI 
through the realist lens to see how much Chinese OFDI activity reflects realist theory. As 
in the previous section on economic theory, a contemporary understanding of realist 
theory is presented, followed by an analysis of Chinese OFDI through the theory. 
1. Realist Economic Theory 
Realist theory is essentially all about the struggle for and achievement of relative 
power.122 To a realist, the world is made up of rational, unitary state actors that compete 
in a zero-sum, anarchic world. The realist great power struggle varies between two major 
subdivisions of realism: defensive, or structural, realists; and offensive realists. For the 
adherents of the defensive school, like Kenneth Waltz, the world is tenuously balanced 
between each nation-state’s martial capabilities which cancel each other advantage 
out.123 Offensive realists, guided by their founder John Mearsheimer, see it differently. 
Great powers actively compete against each other until one nation-state gains supreme 
hegemony, either regionally or globally.124 In both sub-schools, national interests and 
security are superior to all others interests. 
Realist theory translates into political economy though the adaptation of 
neomercantilist policies that accept the principles of liberal trade and economic theories 
while placing limits on the range of goods traded and imposition of tariff and 
                                                 
121 See Aaron L. Friedberg, “‘Going Out’: China’s Pursuit of Natural Resources and Implications for 
the PRC’s Grand Strategy,” NBR Analysis 17, no. 3 (September 2006): 17. 
122 Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy 145 (November/December 2004): 55. 
123 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
124 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
 47 
protectionist measures to protect certain aspects of the national economy.125 Indeed, the 
foremost advocate of economic nationalism and neomercantilism, the German Friedrich 
List, who famously said “The power of producing wealth is therefore infinitely more 
important the wealth itself” accepted many of the tenets of Adam Smith ideas but crafted 
them to suit the fomentation of national power.126 Similarly, Jacob Viner, a Canadian 
economist who significantly influenced the development of economic nationalism, said 
“wealth is an absolute essential means to power, whether for security or for 
aggression.”127 
Fundamentally, the role of the state is to promote the production of wealth to 
serve the national security interests of the state and all other considerations are 
inferior.128 Should conflict or differences arise between domestic economic 
considerations and international security, the state will, according to realist political 
economic theory, intervene and arbitrate in favor of national security.129 Additionally, 
international relations will shape economic patterns through both limiting production of 
national security related items to domestic, or allied, economic centers and the use of 
economic means to gain political leverage. Seen in Nazi Germany’s use of asymmetric 
trading relationships which built leverage over smaller states, this method of shaping 
international relations through economic means can also be used to gain influence with 
“overly generous concessions.” Economic growth is associated with conflict and war 
through a fundamental shift in the balance of relative power among nations.130 To limit 
and inhibit any shifts in relative power, especially as capital becomes increasingly 
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invested abroad, states will enact taxation polices, trade barriers, and other measures that 
favor their increase in relative power.131 
In summation, if a state is engaged in a form of economic nationalism based upon 
realist theory, the state should have a significant and pervasive influence in their 
international economic affairs, instigate economic policies oriented toward maintaining 
and gaining national security vis-à-vis potential threats, use economic means to gain 
influence, engage in economically protectionist practices, and intervene in economic 
matters. 
2. Analysis 
Chinese OFDI interpreted through a realist lens produces mixed results. There are 
both instances of convergence and divergence with the theoretical framework laid out in 
the previous section. This subsection will highlight instances where Chinese OFDI 
appears inconsistent with a realist interpretation and where Chinese OFDI falls in line 
with realist theory. 
Beginning with the inconsistencies, China’s emphasis on acquiring “strategic 
assets” or internationally recognized brands that have worldwide appeal is not consistent 
with realist theory. Realist theory expects that a state will “shape their policies in light of 
[the consideration for war].”132 As mentioned in earlier chapters of this thesis, China has 
begun to make investments and purchases of some internationally recognizable brands 
like Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s laptop subsidy, Haier’s purchase of Thomson TV and 
the failed bid for Maytag, and Geely’s purchase of Volvo Cars. While it was also argued 
that these investments has thus far been less than successful, it is immaterial as long as 
Chinese firms continue to make direct and substantial efforts to acquire international 
brands because it indicates a willingness to engage in international commerce which 
would be negatively affected by war. The Chinese emphasis on a investing in strategic 
assets and brands indicates that Chinese policy wants to maintain a stable economic 
environment with other nations and goes against realist predictions. 
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The second inconsistency with Chinese policy comes from what most analysts 
would say is a prime example of Chinese state invention and direction of OFDI. As 
mentioned in Chapter II, the NDRC, in coordination with MOFCOM, periodically issues 
a list of nations and industries Chinese firms should invest in.133 Yet, even as the central 
government issues this direction, Chinese firms feel no obligation to follow it. 
Principally, one country that is often nefariously connected to potential Chinese attempts 
at instituting a new world order, Iran, is not on the list, and Chinese firms still engage in 
Iranian investment even though the central government implicitly tells them not to. In 
fact, the catalog of “preferred” states is more than a third of the world’s nation-states with 
23 Asian nations, 15 African, 11 European, 11 nations in the Western Hemisphere, and 5 
states in Oceania.134 The disparate and expansive number of nations and industries listed  
demonstrates that what is speciously described as firm, specific, and direct guidance is 
really broad, general advice that most, if not all, nations disseminate to domestic firms. 
Phillip Saunders characterizes these and other policy actions by China regarding foreign 
investment as “modest compared with U.S., European Union, and Japanese programs.”135 
Additionally, while the Chinese government maintains a requirement to receive 
governmental approval for overseas investment, the approval process has been 
decentralized away from the central government toward the provincial governments.136 
Overall, the central government’s direction is broad and modest with the exception of 
investment in sensitive economies like Taiwan and control has shifted more toward the 
provincial level. Further, as mentioned in Chapter II, most firms are driven by profit 
maximization rather than so-called strategic objectives by the state. 
A final instance where Chinese OFDI is inconsistent with a realist lens is the 
strategically important NOCs, which buck government direction in coordinating 
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investment with foreign firms and undercutting other Chinese state owned enterprises.137 
If the central government were going to intervene in any foreign investment issue with 
strategic implications, it would be in the petroleum sector. Current research supports the 
conclusion that the trend is moving away for central government intervention toward the 
commercial and business interests of the individual firm. 
There are, however, some instances where Chinese OFDI and, specifically, 
government policy pertaining to OFDI, reflect a realist interpretation of Chinese OFDI. 
Falling under the old Soviet model of official appointments of prominent cadre to 
leadership positions, China’s nomenklatura system selects and appoints the heads of 
state-owned enterprises.138 Since the last nomenklatura system reform in 1998, the 
Central Committee has maintained direct control of leadership appointments in 44 non-
financial SOEs, the Party Central Large-scale Enterprise Work Committee directly 
appoints the leadership for another 120 non-financial SOEs, and the Party Central 
Finance Work Committee maintains control over the appointment of 40 more financial 
SOEs. In addition, provincial, municipal, and other local party organs control company 
personnel appointments for an estimated 600 to 700 smaller SOEs.139 
Similarly, the CCP has been able to exert some type of influence in private firms. 
A recently released investigative report on Chinese telecommunications companies 
Huawei and ZTE indicates that the CCP maintains, for undisclosed reasons, internal party 
branches even though these firms are privately owned.140 
Secondly, the central government has demonstrated an ability to directly intervene 
in OFDI to limit or inhibit potential losses of economic power. Mentioned in Chapter II, 
the State Council issued a circular in 1993 addressing the subject of capital flight and the 
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need for better management to prevent it.141 This central government intervention in 
economic matters resulted in the significant drop in outward Chinese OFDI and is 
consistent with a realist interpretation of government policy on Chinese OFDI where the 
government would intervene to prevent a loss of relative power. 
Finally, the realist lens appears to be converging with Chinese OFDI and central 
government policy concerning Chinese-Taiwan economic relations. As will be discussed 
in the next chapter on the geopolitical effect of Chinese OFDI, the central government 
has acted in a manner consistent with Jonathan Kirchner’s description of realist political 
economy, specifically the development of asymmetric economic relationships to increase 
political leverage through expenditures of wealth shaped along political lines.142 Seen 
currently under the new relationship being developed under the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA), China is sacrificing, or, at least, delaying any economic 
gains for increased economic cooperation potentially aimed at gaining political leverage 
over the island. This will be further discussed in Chapter IV. 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed Chinese OFDI through economic lenses and a realist lens. 
Buckley and Casson’s internalization theory and John Dunning’s eclectic paradigm were 
presented to understand the theoretical reasons why firms would chose to invest abroad. 
These theoretical assumptions were used to assess Chinese OFDI actions and the result 
was a general convergence with both theories with a few exceptions. Following the 
economic lenses, realist international relations theory and how it relates to political 
economy was presented as an alternative theory for the interpretation of Chinese OFDI. 
Both defensive realist theory and offensive realist theory was presented and applied to 
Chinese OFDI. While there were areas of similarity between realist theory and 
governmental actions regarding Chinese OFDI, there were equally as many 
inconsistencies with realist theory. These mixed results underlie the fundamental 
requirement to assess each foreign investment from China individually; while the vast 
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majority of Chinese OFDI appears to correlate with sound economic fundamentals, there 
is always the possible lone outlier investment that is initiated for reasons other than profit 
maximization and generation of wealth. Overall, Chinese OFDI appears to be mostly 
consistent with economic theory and only marginally consistent with realist theory. 
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IV. THE GEOPOLITICAL EFFECT OF CHINESE OFDI ON THE 
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
Chinese OFDI has grown from practically nothing prior to Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic reforms in 1978 to over $68 billion annually in 2010, yet it is only very 
recently beginning to be studied.143 Similarly, since 2002, China has advocated a policy 
of “Going Global” for domestic firms to invest abroad. The increase in China’s OFDI, 
combined with growing tensions over its territorial claims, military modernization, and 
apprehension over economic turmoil from the global recession, has sparked fears that 
China will begin to challenge the current social, economic, and political order. Some in 
the West believe that China’s OFDI is part of a mercantilist strategy against the United 
States, or the “Go Global” policy is part of Chinese grand strategy, a so called “charm 
offensive,” to advance political influence and gobble up the world resources through 
growing economic power.144 Others see Chinese OFDI through a slightly less threatening 
perspective and as guided more by economic policy and commercial factors.145 
This chapter attempts to answer the fifth major research question by analyzing 
what effect Chinese OFDI has had on the Asia-Pacific region. Utilizing a country-by-
country basis (with the exception of the South Pacific region, which is analyzed in 
whole), this chapter correlates Chinese OFDI in each country since 2002 with the 
geopolitical dynamic between Beijing and the countries studied. The countries and 
regions studied, in the order that they are presented, are: North Korea, South Korea, 
South Pacific, the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, and Taiwan. Overall, the results are 
mixed. OFDI appears to be helping China gain influence in Taiwan and some parts of the 
South Pacific. It is causing conflict with the Philippines and correlating to rise and fall of 
public opinion regarding China in South Korea. It is having negligible effect in swaying 
Indonesia Beijing’s way, but it correlates with increased cooperation between the two 
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countries. It is having an inconclusive effect in Japan (if not slightly negative); and, in 
North Korea, Beijing actually appears to be becoming more influenced by Pyongyang 
rather than the other way around. 
Before presenting the case studies, a description of the methodology is presented. 
The format of each case study is to present the dynamics of Chinese OFDI during the 
period studied (typically from 2002), then present how the relationship with the China 
has changed, and conclude with what, if any, inferences can be made to the effect of 
Chinese OFDI between the two countries. During some of the case studies, commonly 
held beliefs as to goals China has are mentioned, but, more often than not, these beliefs 
are presented to contrast actual findings of the correlative effect between the OFDI and 
bilateral relations. Similarly, this is chapter’s intention is to be a correlative study and 
make no pretense that ODFI is a causal factor. There are numerous competing and 
significant factors that push and pull nations in the region and assuming that OFDI is 
dominant would be tenuous. With this being said, the intention of this chapter is to 
analytically present the effect of the changing levels of OFDI into the region and see how 
it correlates with China’s relationship in those countries. 
A. NORTH KOREA 
Investment in North Korea has generally been a difficult and unwanted process by 
most nations, but China has been the largest nation, other than South Korea, to invest in 
the country. Since 2003, Chinese investment has averaged $15.3 million, but it has swung 
widely from year to year, with investment peaking in 2008 at over $41 million only to be 
followed by a low of less than $6 million the next year. The total stock of Chinese 
investment in North Korea, however, has increased over tenfold from 2004 to 2010, 
growing from just over $21 million to greater than $240 million.146 
The reported volume of investment, along with perceptions of close Sino-North 
Korean cooperation and the inherent stagnation of Pyongyang’s economy, has led many 
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to believe that China possesses significant influence over North Korea.147 Part of this 
assumption is found in asymmetric interdependence theory. Some scholars believe that 
one of the primary motivators for Chinese investment in North Korea is to strengthen 
Beijing’s political influence within the regime, as well as to get Pyongyang to embrace 
economic reforms.148 
However, a casual observation of the relationship between Beijing and 
Pyongyang would indicate that increased investment by China in North Korea has not 
had any appreciable effect on influencing the regime towards China’s interests. 
Significantly, Jaewoo Choo remarks, “Beijing’s lack of prior knowledge about the 
military exercises may be ipso facto a manifestation of its persistent denial of political 
leverage over the years.”149 Indeed, with increasing investment in the regime, Beijing 
was unable to prevent the testing of a nuclear bomb in 2006 and was only given 20 
minutes of advance notice.150 This inability to restrain the regime has not been an 
isolated incident as North Korea has engaged in continuous provocative events with the 
transition from Kim Jong-Il to his son Kim Jong-Un with the 2010 sinking of the South 
Korean corvette Cheonan, artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, and the failed 
test fire of a missile in 2012.151 This consistent string of military provocations by North 
Korea, which Beijing had largely denounced until recently, indicates clearly that Beijing 
has gained little political influence over Pyongyang despite increases in Chinese OFDI. 
Secondly, Chinese investment has done little to move North Korea towards 
economic reforms. The Chinese have attempted to use OFDI to move economic reforms 
through a number of different avenues, and they all have seemed to fail. Ironically, the 
North Koreans have canceled many projects, notably at the Musan iron mines, because 
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the preponderance of funding for joint ventures into natural resource extraction has come 
from the Chinese; in effect, the substantial amounts of Chinese OFDI into the DPRK has 
pushed Pyongyang away from reforms and progress.152 Even more recently, it appears 
Chinese investment and economic reforms have only been welcome as long as they do 
not impinge upon Pyongyang’s security goals.153 
In conclusion, the casual effect of Chinese investment into North Korea has not 
seemed to influence North Korea much. Indeed, North Korea has seemed to backslide 
from a previous high point, during the so-called “Sunshine Policy” period with South 
Korea at the turn of the century. Conversely, Chinese OFDI may have contributed to a 
“wag the dog” outcome where it has influenced China’s policy toward North Korea more 
than the investment has influenced North Korean policy toward China as China seems to 
be slightly more conciliatory towards Pyongyang. Bates Gill’s assessment of Beijing’s 
recently policy toward North Korea highlights the increasing diplomatic exchanges 
between the two countries, more accommodating language in the wake of Pyongyang’s 
military provocations against Seoul, and the growing economic linkages between the two 
nations.154 While it might be a tenuous argument that Chinese OFDI has made Beijing’s 
foreign policy more in line with the Pyongyang’s perspective, a casual observance might 
lead to this conclusion and should not be discounted. 
B. SOUTH KOREA 
The effect of Chinese OFDI on South Korea is, perhaps, one of the clearest 
examples of the effect OFDI can have on public opinion. The range of total annual 
investment into South Korea reaches both the low and high extremes in nearly every 
country China has invested in (except for countries seen as tax havens or money shelters) 
and, in concert, public and political opinion of China by South Koreans have mimicked 
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those swings in OFDI flows. While public and political opinion might be influencing 
OFDI rather than OFDI influencing opinion, the correlation should not be spurned 
needlessly. This section briefly sketches the effect of Chinese OFDI as it pertains to the 
Sino-South Korean relationship. 
Annual flows of Chinese OFDI into South Korea have risen higher than almost 
every country except for notable money shelters and tax havens like Hong Kong, Cayman 
Islands, and Luxembourg. Annual flows have also recorded the largest negative change 
since comprehensive statistics began being published by the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce. In 2005, Chinese OFDI reached its peak inflow of over $550 million after a 
steady buildup of positive flows for years 2003 and 2004. The following year in 2006, the 
flow precipitously dropped to under $25 million and averaged a comparatively paltry 
$100 million from 2006 to 2009. Most recently, in 2010, the annual Chinese OFDI flow 
was an astonishing negative $721.68 million!155 
The effect of Chinese OFDI might have affected the South Korean’s public 
opinion of China. As the flows of Chinese OFDI rose in the early part of the 21
st
 century, 
public opinion of the Chinese was on the rise with growing preference among South 
Koreans that China might be a better strategic ally.156 In the second half of the decade, 
however, when Chinese OFDI dropped off substantially and then fell into the negative, 
favorable opinion of China began to wane and increase for the United States.157 The 
degree of change in favorability has not been as extreme as the flows of OFDI and such 
significant events as China’s failure to condemn the North Korean attack on the South 
Korean corvette Cheonan and its shelling of Yeonpyeong Island probably factored in 
recent polling. The shift in public opinion, however, started well before those events 
lending some credibility to the correlation. 
                                                 
155 PRC MOFCOM, 2010 Statistical Bulletin, 82, 88. 
156 Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea–China Relations and the United States (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006): 96–8. 
157 Chung Min Lee, “Coping with Giants: South Korea’s Responses to China’s and India’s Rise,” in 
Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough, eds., Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to its 
Rising Powers, China and India (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Affairs, 2011, PDF e-book): 173–
5. 
 58 
Secondly, the wild swings in OFDI have a loose connection with the ROK 
presidential cycle. The 2005 spike in Chinese OFDI might have been connected to the 
election of the purportedly pro-Beijing Roh Moo-hyun in 2003 and deepening economic 
ties.158 Similarly, the mass exodus of Chinese capital in 2010 might be been tied to the 
more pro-United States election of Roh’s successor, Lee Myung-bak, the belief that Sino-
South Korean relations have soured, and a more confrontational North-South security 
environment.159 These plausible conclusions, however, might reflect less OFDI’s effect 
on the ROK and more the environment’s effect on OFDI, but the correlation is should 
still be acknowledged. 
Overall, the effect of Chinese OFDI appears to present a clear correlation of 
Chinese OFDI influencing public opinion, and, perhaps a little less so, influencing 
political opinion both positively and negatively. The flow of capital investments has 
varied a considerable degree since Beijing has emphasized its policy of “Going Global.” 
The ebb and flow of public perception of China in South Korea has mirrored the pattern 
of Chinese investments, but significant security-related events also probably factored in 
determining the favorability of China. Additionally, the security and political 
environment might be determining the levels of OFDI rather than the other way around. 
In the end, however, the results are intriguing and should not be discounted. 
C. SOUTH PACIFIC 
Chinese OFDI into the South Pacific region coincides considerably with Beijing’s 
“Going Global” initiative. Further, the pattern of investments appears to follow in the 
wake of rebuilt diplomatic connections, rather than investments influencing the formation 
of diplomatic connections. Secondly, the investments only have had a mixed effect in 
obtaining seemingly preferential diplomatic and strategic goals like isolating Taiwan. 
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This section sketches the corollary between Chinese OFDI in the South Pacific island 
region and Beijing’s diplomatic relationship. 
Chinese investments in the region have followed increased interaction by Beijing 
with the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), an international governmental organization grouping 
16 states from Oceania, Micronesia, and parts of Melanesia. Specifically, Beijing has 
focused their investment activities with eight PIF nations that do not recognize Taiwan as 
either the legitimate government of China or an autonomous nation. These nations are: 
the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji (which has since been suspended 
from the PIF), Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu).160 
Investments made by Chinese firms in the region include the Shanghai Deep Sea 
Fisheries investment to build ten commercial fishing boats, fish processing and packing 
facilities, and other industries facilities related to deep sea fishing. The investment has 
been facilitated by the drafting of memorandums of understanding to provide exclusive 
fishing rights to the Chinese within certain portions of each respective nation’s economic 
exclusive zones. A second notable investment is China Metallurgical Construction 
Company’s (CMCC) pledge of over $600 million into nickel and cobalt mines and 
exclusive rights to 85 percent of production for the next 40 years.161 This investment, in 
addition to investments in solar, wind, and natural gas energy resources, has led some to 
believe that these investments are attempts by China to break longstanding western 
influence in the region. 
The results from the investments have been mixed. The speculated goal of trying 
to isolate Taiwan through economic diplomacy has yielded mixed results from OFDI 
initiatives.162 Beijing withheld investment in the Pacific Island Trade Office until the PIF 
secretariat headquarters was moved to a nation that did not recognize Taiwan as the 
legitimate government of China.163 Taiwan has pushed for recognition within the PIF, 
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but Beijing has applied pressure to the Forum to keep Taipei excluded.164 Certain 
nations, however, have been increasingly concerned with Chinese encroachment; Kiribati 
flip-flopped it recognition to Taiwan after Chinese meddling in a national election and 
China’s failure to deliver on investments in the region connected to passport and visa 
requirement relaxation.165 Nauru also switched back and forth between recognizing the 
PRC and Taiwan since 2002.166 
Chinese investment and economic revitalization in the region, however, has led 
some South Pacific politicians to advocate breaking longstanding, historical ties to 
Australia and New Zealand and align themselves more with China. Similarly, because in 
many international governmental organizations, it is “one country, one vote,” Chinese 
OFDI appears to have served to garner a much more sympathetic voting bloc from South 
Pacific island nations in the United Nations, World Health Organization, International 
Maritime Organization, International Labor Organization, and World Trade Organization 
Indeed, Shie notes that since the PIF members have “some of the highest representation 
per capita in international organizations,” dollar diplomacy is the least expensive in the 
South Pacific region.167 
To conclude this section on the South Pacific, the casual effect of the increased 
OFDI in the region is mixed. Taiwan is about as isolated as it was when Chinese 
investment in the region increased exponentially, but China has most likely gained a few 
useful votes within international organizations, in addition, to critical access to natural 
resources rights that include mining, and fishing. Thus, the effect of the OFDI has gained 
some influence, lost some influence, gained some resources, and the overall assessment 
and outcome is mixed. 
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D. THE PHILLIPINES 
The Sino-Philippines relationship has been in the spotlight recently with incidents 
between the two nations surrounding territorial disputes in the South China Sea. These 
events have, coincided with a surge in investment from China in the Philippines. Overall, 
the increased Chinese OFDI into the Philippines has a very strong negative correlation 
with the geopolitical stability between the two nations. This section sketches the extent of 
Chinese investment in the Philippines and the correlation with geopolitical stability. 
Prior to the “Going Global” initiative, Chinese investment in the Philippines had 
historically been very limited with less than 30 investments recorded between 1978 and 
the mid-1990s.168 Further, after Beijing began to emphasize its policy of “Going Global” 
in 2002, investment, Chinese investment into the Philippines did not increase 
dramatically. From 2002 to 2007, China’s total OFDI stock in the Philippines increased 
by a scant $35 million. Chinese investment only became significant after 2010 when the 
flow of investments surged in excess of $240 million and the overall stock nearly 
tripled.169 
One of the most heralded Chinese investments was a joint venture between 
CNOOC and the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) to jointly explore oil and gas 
fields in the South China Sea. A letter of intent was signed by both sides in 2003, but, 
both investment and cooperation has yet to begin.170 Similarly, China Metallurgical 
Group Corporation (MCC) completed a deal valued at over $1 billion in 2008 to begin 
smelting copper from the Philippines, the cost of which most likely will be spread out 
over numerous years.171 Finally, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement that was 
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signed in 2002 came into effect in 2010 and has increased Chinese investment in the 
Philippines.172 
With the increase in Chinese investment into the Philippines, however, bilateral 
tension between Beijing and Manila has soured significantly over a territorial dispute 
primarily concerned with a small island in the South China Sea named Scarborough 
Shoals.173 Indeed, prior to the spike in OFDI, Beijing and Manila regularly held 
engagements between various ministers. The 2006 and 2008 PRC White Papers on 
National Defense list multiple engagements between the Chinese and Philippine military 
officials. Yet after economic investment increased, high level diplomatic exchanges 
between the two nations have declined. Recently, during a conspicuous tour through the 
ASEAN region, PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi passed over a visit to Manila while 
visiting Jakarta, Brunei, and Myanmar.174 
The correlation of a spike in Chinese OFDI coinciding with a deterioration in 
bilateral relations between Beijing and Manila has historical precedence. In 1994, 
numerous Chinese government-backed business delegations visited Manila pressing for 
the initiation of investments “in the areas of port developments, cement production, and 
appliance manufacturing.”175 Shortly thereafter in 1995, Chinese and Philippine military 
forces squared off over Mischief Reef.176 
Overall, there is an unmistakable negative correlation with Chinese OFDI into the 
Philippines. During the early part of the 2000s, the two nation’s relations were rather 
amicable and cooperative. In 2010, however, once overall investment rapidly increased, 
relations soured quickly. This mirrored a set of similar circumstances some fifteen years 
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earlier in 1995 with the Mischief Reef confrontation. While the Mischief Reed incident 
subsided, Chinese OFDI maintained; perhaps so too the Scarborough Shoals incident will 
subsided and Chinese OFDI will continue, however, only time will tell. 
E. INDONESIA 
Consistently, Indonesia has been a top recipient of Chinese OFDI. It has been 
speculated that Chinese investment into Indonesia has been to influence Jakarta to side 
with Beijing in rising territory disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) because Jakarta 
does not claim a significant portion of the contested body of water. Overall, however, the 
use of OFDI to influence Indonesia has been mixed. Additionally, Chinese OFDI seems 
to have contributed to building a perception that China’s rise will be amicable. This 
section will review Chinese investment into Indonesia, and assess the effect on 
geopolitical relations. 
Since the beginning of China’s “Going Global” policy was officially announced, 
China has maintained a consistent and relatively high investment in to Indonesia, when 
compared to other ASEAN nations (other than Singapore). Since 2009, the total value of 
OFDI flows has begun to plateau around the $200 million per year.177 This plateau might 
be temporary as current reporting has indicated numerous investments, and mergers and 
acquisitions of metal, mining, and energy concerns in Indonesia by Chinese 
corporations.178 In any case, China’s OFDI stock in Indonesia remains significantly 
higher than the any other ASEAN nation, with the exception of Singapore. 
Over the same period of time, China and Indonesia have become close strategic 
partners. Signed in 2004, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Beijing and 
Jakarta was the only pact signed between any ASEAN country and China until the 2008 
Sino-Vietnam strategic partnership.179 Military cooperation between the two has 
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increased in addition to cultural exchanges.180 These concrete signs of close cooperation 
correlate almost directly to the rise in OFDI stock, and indicate that Indonesians perceive 
China not a competitor, nor threat. 
The high levels of OFDI, however, appear unable to significantly influence 
Indonesia to side with China on territorial disputes in the SCS or other matters in the 
international arena. During a recent ASEAN summit in Phomn Phen, Indonesia was seen 
as a primary arbitrator of an agreement that would have weakened China’s territorial 
claim while aligning the ASEAN members against Chinese claims.181 Similarly, at the 
first East Asian Summit in 2005, Jakarta reportedly bemoaned the exclusion of a U.S. 
representative.182 Further still, after PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with 
Indonesia officials in Jakarta recently, Beijing mollified their position on the ASEAN 
Code of Conduct in the SCS committing to move forward on the code consensually, 
something that Jakarta had been pressing.183 Overall, it appears that Chinese OFDI can 
only go so far to influence Indonesia’s position on the SCS and within multilateral 
organizations. 
To conclude this section, Indonesia has consistently been a primary recipient of 
Chinese OFDI when compared to other ASEAN nations (excluding Singapore). The high 
level of OFDI has correlated with increased diplomatic, cultural, military, and economic 
linkages between Jakarta and Beijing. OFDI appears, however, to have been met by an 
inability by Beijing to politically influence Jakarta. 
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F. JAPAN 
The Sino-Japanese relationship has been increasingly strained as of late. Similar 
to the Philippines case study, the amount of OFDI by the Chinese into Japan has been 
rather limited until recently. Similar again, deterioration of bilateral relations over 
territorial disputes coinciding with increased OFDI from China. Overall, however, the 
corollary of Chinese OFDI into Japan and the geopolitical effect is mostly inconclusive 
due to structural economic reasons. 
While Sino-Japanese trade has soared and China has become Japan’s leading 
trade partner in terms of exports and imports, Chinese OFDI into Japan has been rather 
limited since 2002.184 From 2003 to 2009, the amount of Chinese OFDI into Japan 
consistently grew, but the average OFDI from China into Japan was a scant $39.26 
million per year. In 2010, however, Chinese OFDI into Japan jumped nearly ten times to 
over $335 million with total stock in excess of $1 billion.185 Most of the major 
investments have been in either real estate, or in the financial sector. 
The 2010 surge in Chinese OFDI coincides with a flare-up in the territorial 
disputes over the Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyudao in Chinese) and the ongoing disputes 
over how to define the economic exclusive zone around the Okinotorishima Island.186 
Similarly, the slow, but steady growth of Chinese OFDI into Japan has been paralleled by 
a slow, but steady, growth of anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan, and anti-Japanese 
sentiment in China.187 
The correlation between Chinese OFDI into Japan and a divergent Sino-Japanese 
relationship is complicated, however. On one hand, numerous Japanese businessmen and 
economists believe Japan’s economic performance and prosperity is tied to China’s 
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economy, but, on the other hand, many Japanese have grown increasingly weary of 
China’s economic influence and have pushed for stronger ties with the West.188 These 
conflicting perceptions combined with the economic structural reality that FDI accounts 
for less than one-fifth of one percent of total capital formation in Japan.189 The extremely 
limited effect of FDI on capital formation and economic support in Japan make any 
inferences on the effect of Chinese OFDI mostly tenuous. 
G. TAIWAN 
The Taiwan case study in this chapter offers, perhaps, the greatest support for 
Chinese ODFI being linked to stabilization of bilateral relations and garnering of political 
influence. While Chinese OFDI remained relatively low until recently, it appears to be 
connected with a better diplomatic relationship. This section sketches the overall 
correlation between Chinese OFDI into Taiwan and the evolving geopolitical relationship 
between Beijing and Taipei. 
Since the 2002 inception of the “Going Global” policy, OFDI from mainland 
China barely penetrated Taiwan. From 2005 to 2009, the average total OFDI stock in 
Taiwan was a less than $150,000!190 This low figure can be attributed to two reasons: 
Taiwan’s 1992 “Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and China 
Area” that curtailed investment from China (but much more liberally allowed Taiwanese 
investment into China), and the Beijing’s attempts to foment intense economic isolation 
after the election of Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic People’s Party leader, Chen 
Shui-bian, in 2000.191 In 2010, after the Taiwanese election of the more moderate Ma 
Ying-jeou, Chinese ODFI stock jumped over ten thousand percent to more than $18 
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million in total value.192 Based upon recent reporting, investment in 2011 appears to have 
almost tripled the 2010 figure.193 
The surge in Chinese investment into Taiwan is undoubtedly liked to completion 
of the ECFA in 2010. The ECFA, and associated side negotiations, allow for increased 
commodity trade, service trade, investment, and dispute settlement.194 The economic 
impact of ECFA translates significantly into political influence because of Taiwan’s low 
overall FDI stock, and the fact that China could quite easily capture a significant share of 
total FDI stock in Taiwan. This is especially true given the statistical conclusion that 
Chinese OFDI is preponderantly invested near China’s boarders.195 Indeed, in terms of 
investments, Taiwan is increasingly dependent on China and the ECFA positively 
influences investment from China in three significant ways: it removes most mainland 
prohibitions on investment, political risks from cross-strait relations are mitigated for 
mainland investors, and joint-ventures are even more attractive because of the 
substantially deferred investment in Taiwanese businesses.196 
Not only have economic ties increased due to this agreement, but so have cultural 
and social ties increased along with the rising OFDI from China. Wealthy mainland 
Chinese are more regularly providing charitable and philanthropic support to 
impoverished Taiwanese; Taiwanese residents are establishing romantic and marital 
bonds across the strait with mainlanders; and educational barriers in both Taiwan and 
China are being removed.197 
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The correlation between the rising OFDI (and economic ties) from the low point 
in the mid-1990s to the mid- to late-2000s is unmistakable. Taiwan was being 
increasingly isolated economically and diplomatically, the 1995 Taiwan Strait Crisis 
rocked the security environment, and Taiwan’s leading politicians were under increasing 
public pressure to declare de jure independence from China.198 Even in the mid-2000s, 
cross strait relations were increasingly being strained with 2005 anti-succession law. 
The shift of Chinese influence coincides directly with increases in economic ties, 
preponderantly from the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement that propelled an 
increase in OFDI. The correlation of Chinese OFDI on Taiwan, then, is very positive. As 
Taipei continues to become more dependent on China for investment and economic ties, 
it appears that the trend of Beijing’s growing political influence will continue. 
H. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Chinese OFDI will continue to be a politically and economically relevant topic in 
the years to come. Based upon contemporary reporting, the next statistical bulletin on 
OFDI from China released by the MOFCOM will almost undoubtedly show a greater 
FDI flow from China. This chapter answered the fifth major research question by 
assessing the geopolitical effect OFDI has had on the region through a country-by-
country (and one region) analysis. The results have been mixed. OFDI correlates with an 
increase in Beijing’s political influence in Taiwan, and some parts of the South Pacific. 
OFDI appears to correlate with a deterioration of bilateral relations with the Philippines, 
while correlating with shifts in public opinion in South Korea. OFDI does not appear to 
have had any effect swaying Indonesia’s political positions, but does correlate with an 
increase in cooperation. In Japan, the correlation of OFDI on bilateral relations is 
inconclusive, if not slightly negative. Most interestingly in North Korea, Beijing appears 
to be actually becoming influenced more by Pyongyang rather than Beijing gaining 
influence over them. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has presented a comprehensive overview of the effect of Chinese 
outward foreign direct investment on the Chinese economy and on the geopolitical 
environment. Divided into five major research questions, this thesis researched why 
Chinese firms invest abroad, how the historic and current scope of China’s OFDI should 
be assessed, how Chinese OFDI has affected the Chinese economy, how the leading 
economic theories on OFDI and realism could account for the rising emphasis placed on 
OFDI, and what geopolitical effect Chinese OFDI has had on stability, security, and 
cooperation in Asia. A summation of the results follows. 
Based on the analysis found in Chapter II, Chinese firms currently invest abroad 
for four main reasons: to expand or maintain access to markets; to maintain access to 
natural resources like metals, oil, and fisheries; to gain access to technology and 
management techniques; and to acquire or gain “strategic assets” that have international 
recognition. There has been some governmental direction for Chinese OFDI, limited to 
investments made by state-owned enterprises (SOE), but SOEs have demonstrated that 
they are motivated primarily by economic and commercial factors like profit 
maximization rather than responding to governmental direction. Overall, Daniel Rosen’s 
and Thilo Hanemann’s pithy remark is apropos: “The image of agents from the Politburo 
commanding state enterprises to ‘go buy the world’ is largely fictitious.”199 Chinese 
firms are going abroad almost entirely because of economic and commercial motivations. 
The current scope of Chinese OFDI was addressed in Chapter II. Due to 
differences in methods of accounting for Chinese OFDI by the PRC’s Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM), geographic and sectoral distribution of Chinese OFDI should be 
assessed through a compendium of sources. This thesis has used the MOFCOM’s 2010 
“Statistical Bulletin on China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” numerous editions 
of United Nation’s Conference on Trade and Development’s annual World Investment 
Reports (UNCTAD WIR), long running surveys of Chinese enterprises, secondary 
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analysis by reputable international economic think tanks such as the Peterson Institute of 
International Economics, independent ledgers of OFDI actions such as Derek Scissor’s 
China Global Investment Tracker, and statistical analysis of Chinese investment activity 
to develop a thorough and balanced geographic and sectoral understanding of Chinese 
OFDI. Overall, the preponderance of Chinese investment is in the Asia region and, while 
the absolute value of investments from China into regions like Latin America, Europe, 
and Africa are increasing, the total share, or percentage, of total OFDI from China into 
those same regions, is either maintaining historic levels or actually decreasing. 
With regard to the business sectors Chinese OFDI is invested in, Chinese OFDI 
statistics on sector distribution suffer from similar deficiencies as those on geographic 
distribution because the MOFCOM sectoral categories are not aligned to industry 
standards and do not reflect the final industry invested in. Remedying this issue, this 
thesis has drawn from a range of sources such as the UNCTAD WIRs, secondary 
analysis, surveys, in addition to MOFCOM statistics. Using these sources, it was found 
that natural resource-based investment such as mining, petroleum, fisheries and 
agriculture, manufacturing, and financial and business investment are the leading sectors 
of Chinese investment. Further, as highlighted in Chapter II, the sectoral distribution of 
Chinese OFDI is not consistent with international norms but, when view from a 
contextual lens, the investment pattern mostly is consistent with leading OFDI economic 
theory given China’s disposition in the world economy, and due to numerous barriers to 
entry. 
Inherently hard to quantify, the Chinese economy has benefited in some ways and 
in other ways it still has yet to realize any benefit, and there have been a few negative 
effects. The domestic economy has benefitted from access to critical natural resources 
and creation of necessary infrastructure for global commerce, and Chinese firms have 
also increased their rapport in the global market, opening avenues of investment and 
opportunity. The managerial skills of Chinese firms, especially large SOEs that have 
invested abroad, do not appear to have markedly improved. This maybe a symptom of the 
need for requisite “dwell time” to realize burgeoning changes within senior leadership 
and provides for guarded optimism that more benefits of investing abroad are coming. 
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Finally, Chinese OFDI has not yet acquired brand recognition, or “strategic assets,” 
which have been a recent focus of investments; in some ways, OFDI into certain 
international brands have decreased the attraction of the brand. Overall, the effect of 
Chinese OFDI on the Chinese economy has been mixed, if not slightly positive. 
Analyzing Chinese OFDI through the lenses of the major economic theories 
regarding OFDI and the realist theory of international relations has yielded interesting 
results. Chinese OFDI patterns fall mostly in line with Buckley and Casson’s 
internalization theory and Dunning’s eclectic paradigm. Conversely, a realist political 
economy lens developed from theories proposed by Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, 
and John Mearsheimer provided marginal utility since many realist, national power-based 
predictions do not correlate to Chinese OFDI actions. Overall, economic theory is a much 
more suitable lens for analyzing OFDI actions than realism. 
The final major research goal of this thesis was to document and analyze the 
observed effect of OFDI from China into specific states and areas in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The countries and regions studied are: North Korea, South Korea, the South 
Pacific, the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, and Taiwan. Using a mix of public polling, 
secondary analysis, statistical comparison, and political trends, the overall correlation of 
trends in Chinese investment into particular states and changes in the geopolitical 
environment is mixed and inconclusive. OFDI correlates with an increase in Beijing’s 
political influence in Taiwan, and some parts of the South Pacific. OFDI appears to 
correlate with a deterioration of bilateral relations with the Philippines, while correlating 
with shifts in public opinion in South Korea. OFDI does not appear to have had any 
effect swaying Indonesia’s political positions, but does correlate with an increase in 
cooperation. With respect to Japan, the correlation of OFDI with the course of bilateral 
relations is inconclusive, if not slightly negative. Most interestingly in North Korea, 
Beijing appears to be actually becoming influenced more by Pyongyang rather than the 
other way around. 
Finally, this thesis hypothesized that the geopolitical effect of Chinese OFDI 
would be mostly stabilizing and moderate tensions in the region. This hypothesis has not 
been fully borne out due to current tensions in China’s relations with Japan and with the 
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Philippines. However, as in the case of all ideal international relations models, there is 
still possibility that this hypothesis will be confirmed because of the documented effects 
of OFDI in Taiwan, Indonesia, and elsewhere. Only time will tell. 
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